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lo t th i s ocmvmtiont.* s t lp T!t«n*8 mlnAs and 
Ijcarts, l a t ife i i f t the© al»ve natioiial fears ana 
suKpicloa-;* Lat I t give a oa l l t» aov© foj^mrd t» 
Ijociaa "brotterliDod aad a i^ay from zmoHmr destmotslon, 
% lia^e f a l ^ : ii- tixo gooebxess of maja, f attti that ii© 
t4.ll mt tiiibsit to that maanGss of riaoiQar vai?, Truth 
v i l l ti?i\2E^, not laar or falaehoo^ 'sauity u l l l 
prowaH, not insanity* 
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BQ5^ ,<s[rguw<^  9,f i^<M'» ^^^cle^^^ pg.u<?y 
India i s a country Oi ax.cient c i v i l I z a t l o n s anc cul tures* 
I t has been t h r . uyh many vacessitucies. Inc ia ' e policy of 
to le rance h s ca r i c o h«-r t h r ; yh turbulent tiirse. , Compassijn 
\:c.B the niessaye oi. Bud£h& <n< r ahavi ra , Ashoka in the 3ra 
century B.C. had airoilrr no t ions , m our own e ra , Kchatina Gandhi's 
i t r a of non-violence* fehich ^. a usrt t-s a successful vtapon 
aga ins t a mighty foreign empire, cenr-ot be to ryo t t en . 
But Ind ia ' s p i icy oi; non-£liv,r,pcnt# i s not e thing 
tasi 6 on the philosophy o*: SiCtuhertha anr r^cihavira, t'ot even 
on the teachinys of i. hatroa Ganohi's Ahicnsa, but a po l i cy , based 
on the p r inc ip le of l i ve and l e t l i v e . In t l a^s lone, t r a d i t i o n 
of hum nisro had cjndeavourtd, t o synth s i s e hjtnan values and 
made i t more necessary t o retneinber those values , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
while usirvj forces which \v: 6 des t ruc t ive po t en t i a l s as th«y 
were teased on Lhe pol icy of l i ve anc l e t l i v e t 
India a f t e r independence, decided not t o jo in e i the r 
power blocs but t o e x i s t independently and viork for the fu r the -
rence ot wo'Id peace. I t acopted a policy of non->aliynment,which 
was nei ther pro Russian nor pro-American but a pol icy of 
peaceful co->exi8tence v<.xth both the power blocs* 
1. Indire Gandhi, ItW Yftjfff g l i B ^ m g * Selected Speeches (August 1969 t o August 1972) publ icat ions Division, Ministry 
of XnforRMition and Oroadcesting, Oovt* of India (New Delhi April 1975} , pp. 422-423, 
Ind ia ' s pol icy makers t r i e d the i r bes t , to find ways and 
means, to make the i r foreign pol icy stronger ayainst adversar ies . 
I n d i a ' s diplomacy l a i d baTg the aggresso~s cxpansiortist p l s i s , 
exposed the mortal dangers they spel led i:or many nations and 
people, and worked hard t o s top the aygrensor p^wer from 
tack l ing , Oi. together t h e i r policy of armament. At the same 
t ime, i t exposed the scheme oi- react ionary governing c i r c l e s of 
v.'cstern pov^ers, t rying t o placate the aggressors and tryiny to 
c r ea t e tensions among nat ions . 
I n d i a ' s nuclear pol icy, l ike the pol icy o^ non-alignment, 
vas the product of deep and long raixje thinking by men, \.ho had 
spent the best par t oi t he i r livens i i . s t ruggle ayainst the 
Br i t i sh rultj ano for the countrys independence. Above a l l i t \vas 
a product of vision of Nehru, who hod summed up Ind ia ' s quest for 
se l f -d iscovery tha t had s t a r t e d in the nineteenth century, under 
2 
the impact of western ideas . 
Nehru v/as convinced tha t the road to recovery and 
regenerat ion for India , lay in turning our a t t e n t i o n to science and 
technology. But, he was not blind to the des t ruct ive po ten t ia l 
of the tremendous power given to the man, by sc ience. 
According t o Nehru, the future of In<5ia, and the s p i r i t of 
sc ience , tampered with the hiyhest Ideals of mankind were 
inex t r i cab ly linked together . He firmly believed tha t India could 
2. Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of Infiia. Meridian Books 
(London, 1960) , p . 37. 
regain her l o s t v i t a l i t y / her pride and independence and embark 
on the path of material as well as s p i r i t c e i regeneration only 
i f i t opted for s c i e n t i f i c and technological development, i n 
concert with In te rna t iona l co-operation. He sa id : 
"We have a long way t o go, and much leeway 
t o mcke up, before we can take our proper 
s t a t i o n with others in the van of human 
c i v i l i z a t i o n and progress . I t v.as I nd i a ' s 
way in the past to welcomci and absorb other 
cu l t u r e s . That i s much more necessary today 
for march to the one world of tomorrow, where 
national cul tures intermingle with In te rna -
t iona l Cultures of human r^ce . Thus v;e sha l l 
remain t rue Indians cind A s i a t i c s , anc become 
a t the same time good i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s end 
world c i t i z e n s . " 3 
The throe guiding p r inc ip les of Indian Kuclear policy 
during Kehru era were: 
1. India must develop a sc ien t i i i i c temper or mine, 
acquire and keep abreas t v.ith the l a t e s t developm^^ n t s , in a l l the 
f i e l d s of s c i e n t i f i c thought, t o regain and maintain i t s 
i n t e l l e c t u a l v i t a l i t y , end keep pace, with the s p i r i t of age. 
2. Technology based on the s c i e n t i f i c thought, was of 
fundamental importance, to the r e a l i s a t i o n of Ind ia ' s economic 
goals and the country must not lose time or ef for t t o equip 
i t s e l f with the already developed and developing technology. 
3 . Ib^d. , p . 581. 
3 . The s c i e n t i f i c teniper and the appl ica t ion oi technology, 
rcust be made cons is tent v^ith responsible in ternat ional ism ant? 
4 
reconcilf d v;ith the hi^h* s t Ideal of the B^e» 
The f i r s t two Oi these guiaing pr inc ip les e.vplciii the 
ratioiKile of lnoia»s ctecision to embark ur>on an atociic energy 
pro<BJ«"aawBe inmecliately a f t e r t t e Independence. 
The thirc" yuiidir^j p r i n c i p l e , setitns t o lisve c'etermincc" the 
peaceful. c torEcter oi Inc ia ' a nucl<. ar po l icy , ves the r e s u l t o£ 
Kehru'o %.orlc viev; an<3 his p tss ion iior peace. He considered 
nuclear power v i t a l l o r the reconst ruct ion, dex^lopiufmt and 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of an i n c u s t r i a l l y end economically weak nation 
l i k e Inc ie . Thus, Incia came face to face i.ith the atom, imme-
d i a t e l y a f t e r independence, with Kehru's v i s ion . Kehru wfcs not 
u n r e a l i s t i c . There v-as evitence th^it the atom coulc be harnessed 
for peaceful purposes d a o . 
In August 194 7, when India a t t a i r ^ d independence, i t was 
m i l i t a r i l y weak and ruined by in ternal s t r i f e , socic'l and economic 
backwardness. I t s main aim was reconstruct ion and developn^nt of 
th« country. In the sphero ot foreign a f f a i r s , i t did not wish 
t o c»ncern i t s e l f , with the t roubles of other peoples, and was 
conten t , t o take a vocal and diplomatic s tand, agains t colonialism 
and r a c i a l d i sc r imimt ion . At tha t stcige, India did not want t o 
4 . LgK atteht d l l a t i a i 2 Vbl. U , no . 23, m eh 13, 1958 (Col. 4735-9), Oovarnment of India (Mew ZMlhi, 1958) . 
Involve in the cold was but a t th*. same time wanted to e s t a b l i s h 
f r i end ly re la t ions v i th both. India was anxious t o m&intain 
f r i end ly ^ala.ti^8S not ^mly \ ^ t h the 9«3.i^. ivUlch %mB a 
powerful and resou; ceful contry but# \vlth .he Soviet Union t oo . 
Geographical considerat ions of In^ie* Demanded tha t she 
should Lollow a pol icy of non-allynnient, as Inc'ia had two powerful 
car.Ktunist neighbours zt her borcers - ChliiB ancl t t e Soviet Union. 
AS a r e s u l t , a tn i l i ta ry a l l i a n c e with a -wtstern bloc was ruled out 
because i t viould h&vo been viewed as an unfriendly ac t by the two 
cotrittiunist powers. Alliance with coratnunist coxintrif s was not 
possible# &a by hi.r t r a d i t i o n s India could not approve the 
rovoluttionary theory o£ cotrnninism. 
The dropping Oii the f i r s t iitanic bomb over Hiroshima on 
6 August 1945, followed by ar-other over Kacjaseki, which resul ted 
in horr ib le loss of human li i :e and massive ^ s t r u c t i o n of proper ty , 
l ed t o sharp re c t ions in Inc i a , The Incian leaders engaged in 
waging a non-violent s t ruggle ^ j r freedom f e l t t h a t by unleashing, 
such a weapon, the United s t a t e s had createc a dangerous s i t u a t i o n . 
jawaharlal Nehru, the congress p a r t y ' s chief, spokesman on 
In te rna t iona l a i . fa i r s , deplored the appearance of ivar with i t s 
f r igh t fu l and horr ible powers o£ destruction* He expressed h is 
concern in the const i tuent Assembly a l s o . Speaking there on 
4 January 1947, seven months before India became independent, 
Nehru decleredi 
i) 
"In essence today, there i s a c o n t l i c t in 
the world i3etv,een two things # the atom tomb 
and v/hat ±t represeats^ and the s p i r i t of 
humanity. I hope that while India w i l l iro 
doubt play a great part i n a l l the material 
spheres , she w i l l always lay s t r e s s on the 
s p i r i t of humanity and I have no doubt i n 
mind that u l t imate ly in t h i s c o n f l i c t that i s 
confronting the world, the human s p i r i t w i l l 
prevai l over the atom bomb". 5 
Nehru considered the bomb as symbol of e v i l . He wanted 
t h e world t o choose between the path of v io lence symbolized by 
t h e atom bomb and the path of peace symbolized by Buddha. He 
wanted the world t o appreciate the horrors of nuclear warfare 
and expressed India ' s <fetermination to campaign for the eventual 
outlawing of the dreaded r^w weapons. He was hopeful that 
u l t imate ly the forces of peace would s u c c e s s f u l l y grapple with 
the menance of the atom bomb. 
After independence as the f i r s t prime Minister of India, 
jawahar Lai Nehru continued h i s crusade against the atomic bomb 
and other nuclear weapons. 
saidt 
Speiaking in the Indian Psrliaroent on 2nd April 19 54, he 
•*A new weapon of unprecedented power both i n 
volume and i n t e n s i t y , within an ascerta ined and 
probably unascertainable range of des truct ive 
p o t e n t i a l in respect of time and space, that i s 
both as regards the duration and the extent of const 
^quenoes i s being t e s t e d , unleashing i t s massive 
power, for use as a weapon of war. We know 
that i t s vme threatens the ex i s t ence ol a 
contd« 
5 . Jawahar L«l liehrm It^dia's Foreign pol icy* Se lec ted 
Bemmi&mm («»pife«ib»r l94S-April 1961} , P i i b l Scationa 
m(fimi9n0 m a i a t r y of Xnformatlon and Broaa^s t ing 
(mv l e l l i i * 1 9 « l ) , p . l i . 
man cind c i v i l i z a t i o n as we know i t« vve are 
t jld t ha t there i s ro ef fec t ive pro tec t ion 
against the hydrogen txmb and tha t wllllorai 
of j ^ j p l e may tse exterminated by c sins^Ie 
expioaion 'ktSf tnaxty itrorc i»Jtt<^e4 a^nd perhaps 
s t i l l itwny iTiore conc5«nned to slovx ^ a t h , or 
t o l ive under the shadow of the fear of 
disease and death." 6 
This \.oS a horr ibl ' ; prospect i-or n^cions one peoples 
everywhere* whether involv* cl in v.ars < nc power bloc8# or ut^t* 
That i s v;hy, Prinst. Minister £iehr|yi s t r e s sed : 
"I ankind l^s t o ai;ak£n its? If t o tlm r e a l i t y 
L.n€ face the s i t u a t i o n with determination anti 
acse r t i t s e l f t o aver t the o- lamity." 7 
F i l i t a r i s tn , even a f t e r tli?- second wo- l^d war loomed large iii 
the mintis ok uicn. l.ar as e t i l l very rauch ii tn ans of nat ional 
po l i cy , itie united S t e t t s anc; tlm Soviet Union had emerged as 
super powers, vedded t o apposite Ideolo^jies and held diiferiiKj and 
of ten conf l ic t ing viev.s on In te rna t iona l issues* Their expenditure 
on armatnents were ever on inc rease . Ttds (xjald have r e su l t ed in 
the ann ih i l a t ion of the whole world. The s i t u a t i o n was well 
assessed by Kehru, wiien he saidi 
"We l ive in the aye o£ c r i s i s . . . Tortured 
htjnanity hunyers for rea l peace* but soBie 
ev i l fa te pursues i t« and pushes i t fur ther 8 
and further avay from what i t desires most." 
6 . HJ^* PP* 187-138. 
7. ThlA.. p . 189. 
8* JiiiAiu* P* ^ ^ 3 . 
6 
India looked upon nuclear weapons as a symbol of ev i l and 
t r u t e force* I t had shown a way t o deal with the brute force 
with a nevi weapon* the weapon of non-vtoreirt res t s ta i roe . In 
fact* i t won 1-s freedar. iroin foreign rule* ot about two hundred 
yea r s , by following t h i s pe th shown by J .^ehatma Gandhi. 
The GSandhian pr inc ip le ox. p u r i t y of rot ens* v s th corner-
9 
s tone of Inci&'s foreign po l i cy . By making disartoafnent as one 
of the object ives of I m i a ' s Foreign policy India wanted to tnake 
s incere e f for t t o ci'tend tho pr inc ip le oi peaceful co'-existence 
t o internatiorjai r e l a t i o n s . The pursu i t of peaceful co-existence 
v;as possible not by wacjiiij t»ar, bat by teking s teps t t e t would 
lesson t t e cht-nces oi: war enc Itaad tx> mutuBl t r u s t and confidence. 
Nehru was qui te aware of the des t ruc t ive capaci ty of an 
atoir.ic war. He asser ted in the Lok Sabha on 19 Almost 1958» 
"There i s not the shadow of a doubt t h a t 
i f a war i s once s tar ted* tht fu l l paiK>ply 
o£ the weapons, of the atomic age* wi l l 
reveal i t s e l f . " 10 
Relations bet«w«n India and Pakistan* which were bouiuS 
together for centcnries* by common his tory cu l t u r a l her i tage and 
above a l l by Inter-dependence economy* could l^ve become a model 
f o r good neighbouring re la t ions* but t h a t did not happen <after 
9 . AShwanl KUMT Chopra* Ind ia ' s r ^ l j cv on Diafrmament. 
ABC publishing House (New Delhi* 1^84)* p . 5. 
10« Nehru* No* S« p* ^10. 
India anr Pakistan came into beiiiq in 1947. I t could not develop, 
because tt ie ! l»^ed India ba^ bB«n aiviewed on the tvo nation theory, 
of r i v i ' e and rule* v»hxch had always been the po l i cy of the 
B r i t i s h e r s , 
Kashmir had iaeen a s e c u r i t y i s s u e few Ina ia , throuyhuut, but 
a f t e r i t s t r i b a l inx^sion, l^shmir ha6 been in t imate ly conriCCted with 
t h e s e c u r i t y anc deience of India frotri t h aide of Pakistan. With 
t h e termination of the B r i t i s h r u l e in In t ia on IJj August, ly47 
pr ince ly s tat f s v,ere yiven the choice t o j o i n e i t h e r ol; the 
rominioriB Int ia or Pakistan. Moot of the St t e s accedec t o e i t h e r 
inc ia or raid.st6n, Kithout creat ing tiny bitj problcr. for the tv;o 
newly inciependent st< t e s . The p o s i t i o n of Kashmir, howfiver va« 
unirrue in roany r e s p e c t s , as sitiJBted in tlm Morth-ii^st of India 
subcont inent , i t adjoiried both Incia ard rai i is tan. Int ia therefore 
from i t s incept ion as an independent s t a t e , was very much i n t e r e s t e d 
i n the dec i s i on of Itoahir i r f o r , access ion in L-vour of oric 
Dominion or the other . Nehru s t a t e d i n the Indian P&rlieinent, the 
s t r a t e g i c impm-tance of Kashmir for India defence and s e c u r i t y when 
he sa idt 
"we were of Course v i t a l l y i n t e r e s t e d in the dec i s i on that 
the s t a t e would taKe, Ksshroir because of her geographical 
p o s i t i o n with her f ront i er s with three countr ies namely the 
Soviet union China and Afghanistan i s in t imate ly connected 
with the Securi ty and Internat ional contact of Inoia ." 11 
Pakistan** in ten t ion to take ioashmir by force were c l e a r l y 
mxpo—^t when a£t«r the t r iba l invas ion , i t sent i t s regular 
11* piibliatttioM Div i s ion , Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
12 
arned forces t o annex K&shmir. 
I t v&a aga ins t the background o£ these developments t h a t 
India from the b^ginr4ng of IndependeDce h i^d t o e^topt a BiillLary 
or ien ted dtefence po l icy , to p ro tec t i t s e l f from future Pakis tani 
aggression in Kashmir. That was exact ly , why Indian forces had 
t o go t o Kasumir anc^  t h a t i s why, they have stayed on t h e r e . 
In<ria v'ould not vithtfrawn i t s armt ci forces fron the re , as long as 
13 
t he r e i s clanger l e f t of aggression troca ou t s ide . 
The period JMJtween 1947 end Xut2 was character ised by a 
formative s tage in the evolution of Pakis tan ' s power s t r u c t u r e . 
During t h i s per iod, Pakistan clairiod t h a t i t was fol lowii^ a pol icy 
o£ pi-ace, but t h a t descr ip t ion was inislGading. I t was t r u e t h a t 
curing tl i is period Pakistan was not linload with roilitery blocs , 
through mi l i t a ry a l l i a n c e s but was waging a war t o wr<.st Kaslwnir 
frotr Ind ia . 
The Mnerican s t r a t egy of regional mi l i t a ry a l l i ance which 
was worked out by John Foster Dulles had yet to unfotd i t s e l f . But 
the ru l e r of Pakistan were trying to woo Washington a l l the same. 
Pakis tan signed a roiiitary pact v i th USA i n 1954. I t j o i m d 
SEATO in 1954. 
12. j s n k i Sinhi , Pakistan anc the Indo»US Rela t ions , 1947-48, 
Associated Book Agency, (PATNA 1948) , p . 30. 
1 3 . Nehru's S t a t w n t Consti tuent J>saemb;v Debates. pa r t I I , 
Vbl. VX. Mo* It MoVMber 28, 1949 (Col. 8 ) . 
l i 
Pakistan Joined the US a l l i a n c e s , merely to strengthen 
14 
i t s e l f p o l i t i c a l l y m i l i t a r i l y , d iplomatical ly v i s - a - v i s India. 
i n order to speak to India ffom a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h and i n the 
hope that i t could compel India , t o concede t o i t s claim i n 
15 
respec t t o Kashmir. 
The f lov of massive m i l i t a r y a id t o Pakistan by the USA 
and i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n SLATO and CEl<TO a l l i a n c e s , presented a 
s e r i o u s threat t o India 's s ecur i ty end t o i t s t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y s p e c i a l l y i n Kashmir. I t Jaecaroe a s er ious chal lenge 
t o the p o l i c y of non-aligned and i t s c r e c i b i l i t y Jtor the 
p r o t e c t i o n of i t s national s e c u r i t y . It compelled Incia to 
16 
c i v e r t i t s resources i n t o defen«-e production and preparedness, 
Kot only t h i s , but the p e r s i s t e n t c o n f l i c t with pakist* n, which 
r a i s e d ^or India, the f r i g h t f u l begony on two fronts forced i t 
17 
t o seek Soviet support t o r e - i n f o r c e i t s p o s i t i o n . Thus, 
"the p o l i t i c a l and diplomatic s trength , vhich Pakistan had 
s o i ^ h t to achieve by USA* v®s counter balanced by the Soviet 
18 
p o l i t i c s ' and economic backing to Inc ia . 
1 4 . G.w. Choudhury, Tha Foreign Pol icy of pakistan. (Mineo) 
Pakistan I n s t i t u t e of Internat ional s t u d i e s , (Karachi 19 58) , 
p . 4 . 
15 . M.A. Choudhrif*Military pacts Pakistan and Kashrnir" , 
The P^KtoVfB RtY4,^ Ki (February 1957), p . 11 . 
1 6 . Iqbftl Khanam, "India's po l i cy of Non-Alignment and nat ional 
Security", Inillan .Tnurnal of Po l i t i i c s . v o l . XVI, No. 3 
(Aligarh 1982) , p . 119. 
1 7 . B.K. Shrivastava. "India and the united S ta tes" , intarnat ional 
Studiaa, Vs l . 17, no. 3 -4 , July-Dacember (New Delhi 1978)p.760. 
1 8 . M.S. Rajan, t n d a in WgCM Ut^i^9i l^H-S^* (Bombay 1964)p.513< 
In Slno-pakistan f l i r t a t i o n passes had be«n made as ea r ly 
as in 1956 v/hen Suhravardy the then prime Minister of Pakistan 
19 
v i s i t e d China anc> Chou En Lsi reciprocated the v i s i t . But i t vans 
only a f t e r the f i r s t clashes on the Indo-China border in ijongju 
and La<tekh tha t caramon h o s t i l i t y towarc»s India began to draw 
Pakistan ant* China closer cynica l ly disregarding a l l considerat ions 
and openly d i rec ted by naticai«l chauvinism end hatred fear India , 
Pakistan and China found t^jemselvcs workit^ i n close co-ordinat ion, 
Negotiat ions toe a bolder agrceroent between the two covmtries 
20 
s t a r t e d in 1962 and in 1S63 border pact VAS s igned. 
ThB t r u t h w< 8 the pakista.n and China were not ac tuated by 
considera t ions of t h e i r own secur i ty but by a fiiuti»l €tesire to 
cause t t e maximum trouble for India . Ko gre. t e r proof of the 
i l l e y a l nature of the Beijing agreement i s necessary than the fact 
21 
i t was not subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n by the tv«> count r ies . 
The pact i l l e g a l l y bestowing ownership of I n t i a t e r r i t o r y in 
Kashmir on China, vas signed by the; then Pakis tan 's foreign minis ter 
Zulf iqar Ali Bhutto and the t t e n CtiiiK?se Vice-Premier Chen Yi. I t 
was an agrf^ement betweftn two aggressor ' s bound by the common 
ideology of expansionism. 
19 . V.D. Chopra, (ed) Studies in Indo^Pak Relat ions, (pa t r io t 
New Delhi 1984), p . xx 
21* m^' 
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This n l l l t a r y bul la up of Pakistan In tive past led t o 
attac.-s on India vs'lth a view t o s e t t l e t t e Kaslwlr qUt s t l on 
-^ *fitto.^ «aiJL.ls,aj!r^ .__ialehti».____ladtoc _.|;uiclesr_.jPalicy a f t e r lyB2 v.as 
charac ter ized by two dcanlriont t r ends . 
(I) Th£ f i r s t cons is t c" of c®iran€s for %viaer representa t ion 
a t in te rne t iona l disarwaL^ent negot ia t lonsi and 
( I I ) I t \'M8 coRC< rne<S vdth orooocQlG ^.or e ban on ni;K.lear 
22 
t e s t a . I t e r e vas en Increase in «5iplOBa..lc a c t i v i t i e s in 
tlu icield o*: nu-leer po l icy . 
By 1953, tlio consjress j ^ r t y vao \ e H entrenclKJd in pov.er 
and eKt-rnet ly too t t e prospect OJ. be t t e r r e l a t i ons with t t e 
corarounist countr ies p a r t i c u l a r l y ChlKa a t t h i s s tage seened t o 
auger well for Kehru's p o l i c i e s . 
The or ig ina l proposal t o t^i^en representa t ion a t the 
disarmasent ni yo t l a t ions vsas niecie by t t e Soviet Union in 1953 when 
i t asked for the inclusion of IntUa, By 1954, there \»?ere indica-
t i o n s the t the Indian yovernrtient i t s e l f was prepared to lobby fco-
i t s own Inclus ion, mumver, the Incian proposals to the disarmament 
c a l l e d Ear consul ta t ion between the nuclear powers and t l ^ s t a t e s 
not represented in the Disartnament Commission. 
22 . Shyam Bhatia, lyidia's Nuclear Bomb IVik&s, New Delhi 1979) 
p . 26* 
In 1957, an IncJian sponsored Yuyoslov, Canadian, Japanese 
an<5 F^raguyan resolu t ion led to the expansion 04 tiae JDisan»ja?»ent 
Cominission to 25 tn mbers and in 195a# an Inco Yugoslav proposal 
t o include e l l ttie membfrs ot t t e General Asseiubly on the 
Disarmaaent Cotntiission v«a aecepte(3. In 1961 In t ia was one o* the 
s t a t e s vhich bent f i t ed iron the cKpension oi. the ten-nat ions 
23 
DisarmaiTPnt Committee t o lU. Incslau i n t e r e s t in joininy the 
Disarroaaent Car.mission was iM.sc€i on l e h r u ' s tx s i r e not t o see any 
iismortant organizat ion dotainattc by tarcst powers, 
I nd i a ' s p d i c y aimed t o inclutie 4f>*fr3 /isian nations tit 
Disartaer.icnt t a l k s . The reason %as th* t the In t ien government behind 
i t could achieve foreign policy eiics ior wore successfully* on the. 
bas is o Leinr; a leacing membe^ r ot the t h i r c tvorlc c o u n t r i t s , 
Builcing up of the armed forces e i t h e r as an expression of 
na t iona l independence or to si^jport foreign pol icy vas nsrver one 
of Nehru's object ives for Inoependent Ind ia . The reasons were 
two fold. 
In the f i r s t place* building up the aimed forces would have 
meant* diver t ing resources from economic development* which the 
congress leadership considered extremely important and secondly. 
Kehru's f a i t h in the eff iciency of his own foreign pol icy seemed t o 
obviate the need for developing the armed torced as a defence 
23 . K.K. Pathftk* MllBtty PPUffY 9l tntUt r A Thitira ¥91^1^ 
pj-oeaeetiva. Git«nJ«li pratoshac* (Mew Delhi* 1980) p . 114 
l a 
requirement. That f<*reign policy V&B aimed a t keeping IncUa out 
oi a l l r r i i i t e ry a l l i a n c e s . So* as t o avoid involvement in a l l 
cold var c o n f l i c t s . 
However, such a policy b s ides haviny a defence value, 
a l s o became and em: in i t s e l f it. so fcer es i t presented l^iehru's 
otteir.pts to acquirinvj s reputat ion £or indept ndent th inking. 
Kehru's ccinnitment t o v.orK and suppo-t nuclear aisarroainent 
and nuclear arras control v.as unequivocal. There v.as a coherence 
i n the polici ' which he maintained vis* tha t In t ia voulc' ntvcr make 
nuclear weapons, t t e t i t vould work 2car the abo l i t i on of nuclear 
Wi'apons, ©nc t h a t since i t vias c.i££icult t o tichicve tli:,t ob jec t ive , 
i t would support mctisures t ha t might prohib i t or control thf race 
for ntxrlea'^ arms. 
As a matter of ac t nuclear arms control as a concept thauyh 
not defined in a-tna control terminology i s Kehru's seminal 
cont r ibu t ion to the disarmament a debete. By prc^osing in 1954, 
a stand s t i l l agreement with regard to the t stir.g of nuclear 
weapons, he pleaded for the adoption oi a s tep by s tep approach t o 
disarmament. Ko other country was perhaps as a r t i c u l a t e as India 
during the period 1954-63 on the question of nuclea< weapons 
t e s t i n g . Even, when i t was not a member o£ the Cisarmament 
ccxnmission or i t s sub-committee Un 1^56) , i t sought t o explain 
i t s view point in those foroM. Similar ly i t SL^iported nuclear 
f r ee aones and non-spread of nticleer weapons. There i s no 
evicence to suggest tha t Nehru might have thought of a change 
i n tha t po l icy . Since 19S9, India had been regu la r ly votiim in 
l u 
favour o: U.Nt Cen t r a l ^^seinbly i resolut lona on the non-apread 
of nuc lear %«eapons. At l e a s t s i n c e X956# I t had c'ravm t h e 
a t t e n t i o n of the comnunity of ne t i ona In the v a r i a u s U.K. forunss 
t o t h e dcngers o£ any under d i s semina t ion of nuc lea r weapons. 
\ jFhat In<3ia ivi l l no t inanu a c t u r e nuc l ea r vjeanons« has a t 
l e a s t i n r h e t o r i c , been roainteirjed Ly a l l the succe s i v e 
c,ovtrrnicnt3 i n Isei, De lh i . I t imo £3 en a c o n s t a n t tiien» i n t h e i r 
p o l i c i f s . no r in^ the stewar<5ship o£ Jawahcirlal Kehru I n t i a ' s 
couaaite; n t i n t h i s r e s p e c t i.as unequivocal , ho ciJvJu^s vmre c e s t 
on hin bort 2 ices <5uring liis l i4 .e t i iac . 
OKly Eehru could a s s u r e the t;orl«s on behalf of any Ctsture 
govf^rnRicnt of Ind ia t t e t t h i s coun t ry troul^. ir>t tjO i n f o r nuclce^ 
v.caponE. xnaugxirating t h e ©Kiming pool Reactor (-siVSiVm) a t 
rromfcery, t h e f i r s t each r e a c t o r on Asian S o i l on 2C j a n u e r y , 
1957, he sa id f 
* ' . . . ISO man can prophesy t t e f u t u r e . But 
I ahould lilce t o say on behalr of my 
government and I t h i n k I can say wi th some 
a s s u r a n c e , on behalr of any f u t u r e govern-
ment of Ind ia - t h a t whatever might happen, 
whatever t h e c i r cums tances , we s h a l l never 
\me t h e a tomic energy for e v i l purpoeea . 
There i a no c o n d i t i o n a t t a c h e d t o t h i a 
asaurance becauae once a c o n d i t i o n ia 
a t t a c h e d , the va lue of auch an assu rance 
does iK>t go very far.** 2b 
24 . BriJ Mohan Kauahik, " I n d i a n Nuclear policy**, 
" M3l. 17, July-December 19 78, 
[Delhi i 9 7 i j . p . 783. 
2 5 . Nehru, n* 5« p . 193. 
1 / 
There i s no evi(3ence tha t Nehru contemplated a chanye in 
t h i s pol icy even a f te r the secur i ty environment had r a d i c a l l y 
changed in 1962» More than anything eJL«B# i * wa« iperheps hi« 
roental «»ake tip tTtat shaped Ind ia ' s pol icy in t h i s regard. He 
regarded the nuclear v^apons as a "Synibol o£ e v i l " . This view 
was shared by Krishna Kenon as well who r e i t e r a t e d Inoia stand 
even a f t e r his death. In his speech in tlte hok Sabha on Kay 10, 
1954 he sa idj 
" In the l a s t generation or tv;o there have 
been ce r ta in explorat ions o:-. the reraotest 
f ron t ie r s of hunnan knowleoge which are 
leading us t o many s t range discoveries end 
s trange consequences* H^x Planck 's QtE^ntum 
Theory and l a t e r on Albt r t E ins t e in ' s Theory 
of r e l a t i v i t y changed the whole conception 
of the universe. Soon came the atora bomb 
with i t s power t o k i l l • The human mine and 
haiJiin e f for t s ere unleashing tremendous 
T>owers v/ithout qui te knowing how t o control 
them. They carmot be cont ro l led by a mere 
desire or demand £or banning them. Kobody 
can r e a l l y control the human mind trom going 
on unleashing new forces . One oi. the p o l i t i -
ca l problems of the day is how to approach 
t h i s problem of control which i s o£ v i t a l 
consequence. Such an approach presupposes 
some measures of lessening of tension in the 
world* some measure of mutual confidence on 
the pa r t of the great na t ions , some agreements. (^  
t o allow each country t o l ive i t s own l i f e . " 
Certain developments during the Nkhru era which were 
expected t o have an ioqpict on I n o i a ' s Nuclear policy i^eret 
(i) change in Ind ia ' s secur i ty envircnnment as a r e s u l t ot Slno 
26. l y ^ ^ ' P* ^^1 
l6 
Indian conf l ic t in 1962 and (11) the detonation of atomic device 
27 
by China In October 1964* 
But these aevelgisaenta i n no &ay cpopelled i^ebru t o a rder 
the mi l i t a ry u t i l i a a t l o n of t<uclear energy. Kehru however knevi 
t h a t the peact ful uses ot nuclear energy could only be achieved if 
t he r e was an environment of peace* I t could JK>t be used in an 
environment of war and if used i t would not be a peacerul csus©, 
Kehru's comraitincnt Viaa not l imi ted t o verbal exhorta t ions 
and h i s t o r i c a l f l o u r i s t e s . V.'hlle te i-lrmly believed tha t tht: 
nuclear energy was very important to meeting I n d i a ' s eeveloproental 
end energy needs, h is Of^osition to the cfevclopnent and spreea 
28 
of nuclear wearonary *fas ecual ly unrelent ing, Kot only tha t but , 
he caranittGd a l l future Goverr-roent of Incie no t t o produce nuclear 
weapons. 
The border war with China in 1962 and the f a i l u r e of the 
Indian de terence had a profound and las t ing impact upon the Indian 
s t r a t i g i c th inking. Doubts began to be expressed on Ind i a ' s Policy 
of Disarmament. After the Chinsss a t t ack Ind ia ' s dsfemj^ policy 
became increasingily pragnat ic and r e a l i s t i c . Though i t s t i l l 
continued t o follow the pol icy of Disanaament but with a difference. 
27. KAushik, n, 24, p . 781. 
28. SUBlt Ganguly, "why India Joined the Nuclear Clut" Bullet in 
gli A1>9Wtfi ffCAtPt^fflifff vol . 39, no. 4 , April 4 (Chicago, 1983) , 
p . 30. 
1J 
The u t t e r r ou t of the Indian fo rces # tiy t h e Chinese« l ed 
t o marked ch nges i n I n d i a ' s defence o r g a n i s a t i o n / among them 
a f ive year plSfi Tor t n c r ^ a s i i i s tia& army t o 8^25#Oo men# 
developing a 45 squardron a i r f o r c e , equipped wi th icodern 
29 
a i r c r a f t * e> pens ion and mechaniscation pro^jriiione fear t h e army. 
With t h e Chinese a y g r e ' s i c n , I n d i a ' s view of peaceful 
c o - e x i s t e n c e vrith u t adequate defence for t h e coun t ry v;as 
c o r p l e t e l y s h a t t e r e d . The people and t h e pre^a th roughout the 
t?orld conderoned no t on ly the Chinese a g g r e s s i o n but a l s o I n d i a ' s 
p o l i c y of non-el i t jnment. 
Jcirocs Ccmeron fexitirg i n the d a i l y t^ail on October 22, 
1962 a s s e r t e d ! 
"The smal l war between Ind i e end China 
on A s i a ' s ICMt Hot is^n i s now a i::cutal and 
dep lo rab le fact# sad and menancing. For 
those / of us who know and love both 
c o u n t r i e s t h e s e a r e s i cken ing days . These 
f r o n t i e r b a t t l e s are a r c h i a c and a b s u r d . 
To wrangle i n t h i s cosmic years over a 
mean ing less , s t r e t c h oi «ppty mountain 
sidto i s e x p l i c a b l e only i n symbolic terms and 
havs no th ing t o do with the MC Mohan l i n e 30 
or the Hankachu r i v e r or the town of t h o l a . " 
29» United Nat ions i»par tment o£ I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic and 
Soc ia l Affa i rs« World Eaarav aumpl iaa . 1973-78 (New York) 
\fn, p . 284. 
3 0 . Dp^^v mai l (London), October 22, 1962, 
l u 
Another Spanish da i ly No t i c i a ' s Graficas sa ic t 
••t^tody could i^sinore tha t the present world 
s i t u a t i o n i s s e r i ous . In te rna t iona l tensions 
grow day by cay pres ice ly v,hen the Chinese are 
«ttaciclng a peac i fm country India - a country 
of Mahatina Gandhi." 31 
Immediately a f t e r t t e Cliinese ayg'-ession* ^chru declared 
t h a t I n t i a '^^ sis no lonyer non alitjned as Lt-r as Chii*' xvas 
cosct rned. 
h £urthi.r mocii. i c a t i o n t.as tuace in the foreiyn pol icy of 
Inc'i^* i n the sonoe th^it i iJili tary aiC . r s accepted i:rom a l l 
quar t s rc I'or I n d i e ' s ce£eince# ar.c i t v.as laadt t o appecur cons is tent 
with the policy of non-eliynracnt. 
Frequently borcer v io la t ions etc subsequent e t t ecks uere 
but the r e s u l t of lapses in I n t i a ' s foreign pol icy anC defence 
po l i cy viihich w i^s further modified. 
I t vaa f e l t t h a t for Ind ia ' s s ecu r i t y , i t ^as ns cessery 
t o make i t s forces tpto da te . I t ^ y a n t o be f e l t t ha t India 
cannot take care of i t s nat ional secur i ty unless i t Joined the 
nuclear c lub . 
Chinese f i r s t nuclear experiment took place on October 16, 
1964, one year and seven months l a t e r or. May 9, 1966 she exploif^c 
a hydeogen bonb, containing a thermo nuclear ma te r i a l . 
31. Mg^K;i«'f qr^f^9f (Spami October 24, 1962. 
2i 
JuSt a l i t t l e over t*fo y e a r ' s frcxn J t i r s t n u c l e a r t e s t 
on October 21, 1966# she succeeded I n t e r e e t i n y exploding a 
32 
r o c k e t m i s s l e armed with a nuc l ea r warhead. 
Thus ve see t h a t t h e nuc lea r q u e s t i o n s enc i t s I m p l i c a t i o n s 
f o r I n d i a ' s cefence tos been before the n&tion s i n c e 1964^ th. t i s 
from the tiroe# the f i r s t Chinese n u c l e c t e s t I't hOr wn Kehru 
i n t h e beginning \^as l e i g h e d down by id s own cow..itments t o peace* 
But a f t e r t he Chinese agg re s s ion a need uas f e l t t o yive cue 
a t t e n t i o n t o I n d i a ' s defence a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e a d v e r s a r i e s . 
China c o n s t i t u t e s t h e h e a r t l a n d of t h e East~A5?ian t r i a n g l e 
a t t h e o t h e r ex t r cc i i t y of t h e Eurasit-n lan<3miB0 tint has a l l t he 
p o t e n t i a l s of a net^ power C e n t r e . i .vtry s i n c e ti^es a power o r 
o r i e n t e d China lies h en s t r i v i n g t o c o n s j l i c a t e i t s c o n t r o l over 
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t h e s t r a t e g i c s t r o n g holcis i n the r e g i o n . Thus i ;aclear China xxaa 
a big t h r e a t t o I n c ' i a ' s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y ^nc t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g -
r i t y but s t i l l Ind ia never opted for nuc lea r weapons. 
Before the Chinese exploced t h e i r bomb, paKlstan was r a t h e r 
e s t r a n g e d from Inc i a v.xth a d i spu t e over Kashrr-ir and engaged i n 
what can be c a l l e d a t l i r t a t i o n v i t h t h e Chinese comr? unxst 
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regime. 
3 2 . Foreign A f f a i r s Report , n o . 6 Vs l . x v i l , June 1967 (ICWA, Nttw D e l h i ) , p . 7. 
3 3 . I b i d . , no . 6 , \ tol , XVI, Hay 1967, p . 1 1 . 
3 4 . M.R. Mi««ni "The Chal lenge of t h e Chinese Bomb*, Ijo^}^ 
Quarf r l v . ^ 9 1 . XXI, j a n - ^ a r c h (New D e l h i , 1965) , p . 1 5 . 
ZL 
In the North in the HlioBlayas the Chinese armies were 
poised a t the top of tlie Hisaalayas vxth t h e i r guns pointiny down 
a t Xftdia, and in possession of t e r r i t o r y obtained as a r e s u l t of 
the m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s curin-jj October-*ioveraber 1962. The 
Chinese aggression was not only the rout of ttie Indian So ld i e r ' s 
but the fac t t h a t so uuch Indian t e r r i t o r y had been occupit:d by 
a foreign power v.ith l i t t l e hope of i t being reyrined by Inc ia . 
Ind ia ' s r e l a t i o n vjith her neighbours broutjht home t o the 
Inr ian people the icnportance of &£ence end nat ional secur i ty 
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l o r the surviv:;! i^ nd ve i l beincj of ^ n^^ition, hov -^ever I nd i a ' s 
nuclear i ^ l i c y durin»a tlie period of li*62-64 r t a^d out for a l l 
time the p o s s i b i l i t y of India developirx, ivs ovn nuclear v,'^apons# 
v«hile . t the same tiu;c encoa a-jing* tlx app l ica t ion o£ nuclear 
energy for p tac t fu l purposes* p r inc ipa l ly tor the generation of 
e l e c t r i c power. Until 1952, such a policy enjoyed general support 
viithin the countr^y but £j:ter 1962 corisensus btgan to brtak down. 
The main reason w&s the Incien Army defeat during the 
Chinese aggression in 1962 end the rumou s th t Cl^ iina ^^ as develo-
ping nuclear weapons. So proposeils be^ j^an to be a r t i c u l a t e d 
i n 1962 by some members of the opposition pa r t i e s tha t India should 
develop nvKTlrar v* apons while Nehru throughout his l i f e , r e s i s t ed 
3 5, Appadorai, Domestic Roots of Ind ia ' s Foreign Policy,vi947»72. 
oxford University pr«s8 (New Delhi, 1931) , p , 59. 
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such proposals . But a f t e r h is death in May 1964 ana following 
t h e detonation of China's f i r s t nuclear device in October 1964, 
eemands for me ian Tiuclear weapons Incre ised . These dettianas came 
mostly froR- within the ranks ot the major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s 
including the congress. This »^as a sharp departure from the pol icy 
of Kehru who shor t ly befcare iiia death had eeld t h a t India would 
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never develop niK:lear weapons under any ci-^curastances. 
After Chinese at^gression U3 put a s t r o i ^ presaure on 
India t o change i t s pol icy oi: non-^lignnjent but Kehru was ayains t 
any such change to get arms from U.S.A. HE r e iu s td t o get arms 
frora U.S.A. with s t r i n g a t tached t o i t . lneie*s defence End 
foreign policy becaiae pragmetic. I n d i a ' s s t ra ined r e l a t i o n s with 
pakist&n compelled India t o raodxfy i t s l.uclear Pol i cy . Ind ia ' s 
coni- l ict with Pakistan in 1965 and in 1971 mace i t c lear theit in 
ordter to p ro tec t i t s e l f India has to adopt a more r e a l i s t i c 
po l i cy as far as secur i ty of the country was concerned. Against 
the background ot dual th rea t t o Inr ian secur i ty Incia had t o 
t h ink twice before i t adopted a nulcear policy so t a r as the 
peaceful uses oi the nuclear energy was concerned. 
Indian leaders had often expressed tht fear , t ha t the arms 
and ammunition tha t the uni ted States vas providing t o Pakistan, 
would ul t imately be used against India anc that the united States 
36. Hindustan Tinea Weekly, (^ iew Delhi) , 15 Jan , 1961. 
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would not be able to prevent Pakistan from resor t ing t o such 
a misuse o£ i t s arms and ammunition. 
Ind ia ' s fears came t r \ » when Pakistan t r i e d t o get the 
Kashrcir issue resolved by means of US arms in 19^b, 
Paicistan* howevf-r# continued i t s quest i.ar mi l i t a ry p a r i t y 
v/ith India , a f t e r the 1965 Vvar through artns inc uct ion. This 
quest became s t i l l ©ore intense fcfter Pak is tan ' s misadventure in 
1971 leadirxi t o i t s t runca t ion . Pakistan hati teier* d i sas t rous ly 
mauled by Inc'ia, which bad emerged as a prcrnier country in the 
sub-continent anc" the U.S.A. recoi^iniscd %.'>,B s t a t u s as a rcajor 
power in tl:^ region. On the other li^nd pakistc-n vas s t r ipped of 
having any regional s t a t u s . I ^u t to £ecad an iraasediate problem of 
how to r e s to re Pakistan to a pos i t ion of s t rength ai.o s t a tu s in 
t h e nev.' s t r a t e g i c envi'^oxswent, con*.3ntrated on i t s e f fo r t s t o 
achieve i t s se l f s e t aim ox achieving mi l i t a ry pari ty v.ith In; i a , 
began t o concentrate more and more on developir^ nuclear weapons 
i n close oo-operation vdth China a id U.S.A. From the v^ry 
beginning the in ten t ion of PaidLstan had been to make i t s e l f 
s t ronger in ortSer t o demonstrate to India a pos i t ion of s t rength 
in order to « « t t l e the Kashmir question with force . 
Though India has been threatened by Pakis tan 's in ten t ions 
i t has alvays advocated the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
I n d i a ' s Nuclear Policy cid not develop only due to Nehru's v is ion 
but aga ins t the background of developnents in neighbouring s t a t e s . 
2o 
Nehru had readJuBted the policy to su i t India's need of economic 
development. 
American administration has time and ayain jus t i f i ed the 
supply of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan to enable her to meet 
the challenge i t faccs following the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in recember iy79. The delivery of arms by the U.S.A. 
to Pakistan and Pakistan's aim to achieve nuclearisation wil l make 
t h i s region a playground of po%iier cont l i c t s where war would be a 
regular feature. It cannot be denied that Pakistan with a view of 
grabling Kashmir by force has made a persistent incitenant to war 
against XnCia on the Kcshmir issue through oi .f lcial and non-
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o f f i c i a l medias. Pakistan i s boldly goii^ ahead for possessing 
nuclear v^eapons capability and the U.S.A. has been supplying 
sophisticated arms to Pakistan. Tho Islamic countries had also 
been provicUng financial support for i t s nuclearisation pro^ranmte 
t o Pakistan which i s certainly posing a threat to Xnc<ia. The 
Indian GoveriKient under Mrs. Indira Gandhi was well aware of these 
developments. 
It was with surprise that the world learnt of the news 
of India's nuclear explosion of May 1974. Hbwever* i t was not 
in trens lca l ly surprising o£ a nation* teeming with mil lions # so 
37. Lt. Col. (Retd.) Miupender 8ingh« I«do-pak Conflicts Over 
KashBiy-f ABC Publishers (patlala* SeptMiber 1989), pp.163-174. 
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fltrategioally s i t u a t e d as Xn<31a of having a defence budget which 
f o r years have been the f i f t h l a r g e s t in the world a f t e r tha t of 
t h e hX^ end fisediiacR powers no«r feels^ t o mifavel the ftwescHne 
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s e c r e t s of the atom. 
The uni ted Sta tes ra i sed a hue end cry over the nuclear 
t e s t in ^ectisista«-)in Rajasthan and publ ic ly questioned the a l l e g e d l y 
s e c r e t designs behind i t * paliistan realissed i t as a threat t o i t s 
s e c u r i t y and nat ional i n t e g r i t y . I t not only protes ted aga ins t 
I n d i a ' s nuclear t e s t but a l s o speeded up i t s own nuclear p^ c^ryraroine 
t o chal lenge In^ia. The Pakistan m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s ^ere 
under the la^ress ion thc t the nuclear weapons in the i r hand would 
he lp then sometime i n near future to grab K^sl^ir i n om: bold and 
s w i f t move. They appear to be under the misconception that India 
woj ld accept nuclear esyti*roetry. They did not r e a l i z e the £ec t 
t h a t India could a l s o r e v i s e i s nuclear opt ions 1 i t deemed 
abso lu te ly necessary. 
I t was against the background o£ these developments that 
compelled India to develop a choherent and c o n s i s t e n t Nuclear po l i cy . 
3 8 . Pierre M. O a l l o i s , Indian Huclear explos ion and India 's 
Security* fyta^qn Af.1*4^1 ftirP? 
W>1, x y i v , (li»w Delhi 1975), p 
ec r i ty , F y i o  f fa irs Report. januRry-December 1975, 
V, {m\i 5) . 9 1 . 
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Inaia'g i^ftHftg M t o y to %lm ggafcaartf gf P«K3,g^ftal 
^rrrnrronrft 
India bad a very stable and coherenf nilelfir 
TWlloy for nearly fifteen years, That nollcy was 
formulated by Jawaharlal :TebPU. It*s origin lay la the 
Gandhlan t rndl t loa and the policy of non-violcmoei t^dch 
\m% also a nart cf the Indian froodon jitrygglo, 'J^bnx had 
coKoittod a l l atur© n^vcraraontn of India to the osrclunlvely 
Tjoaco.m use of nuolGar eiorgy^ "^ lut after 1diru*c death In 
Just five '..;Qoks aftop the f i r s t Ghinos© orrdosion la 196^ 
IJIG uuscoaaor T«al Baha'iar nhantri debited the comclteient, 
Shartri ran-'xanised that ;io oouir : ^ t nay '.AiGther 
the existing policy o"^  nucloar '^aoifinn xras deer) rooted anri 
t3iat TAiethor i t could be set aside or ohangfxl, %e pressure 
for ttie IMlan bomb in thp beginning *,ns rather jTOlitloal 
than s t r a t ^ i e as India was follovinn on abtEiivalient 
with 
nvMilear policy/an unimpressed but only an Insiijed 
pol i t iea l will to do ao. 
India 's s eeu r l ^ has always be«n threatened from the 
side of Pakistan and not from the side of China because 
Pakistan has always been trying to have parity ^dth India 
in defence and iias been trying to grab Kashialr froD India 
tlirough the use of forSe. Pakistan has also been trying to 
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procure, aucloaJ? roaterials I l legally Inordep to develop 
nuelear weapons* 
Publle d®raandt3 for Indian nuclear weapotis becam© 
intense, aftop the detonation of th© ChlnGs© nuclear dm?ic©s 
aad tiiat vtxs- the period xthcn Lol Bnii?idttr mmstri %7a^ the 
PriHo M i i s t e r . UtlTOti^ li cnoh demands x^ero voiced only by 
cortaia politicsal ^nrtiOD, bisb the i r fr©0U©noy and 
iatoasity frcra (gnong the PBiSks of th© coarress narty forood 
Shnntri to tako a tioro iTe:dLblo a t t i tude to the cl©vclo'-nmt 
Of ntidoar Tmanons*'"^ 
Bier© i s no <5vldoaoc that Shaatri as a resul t of 
thla deriand decided to opt for tlio dcsvelopnmt of nuclear 
weapons, however, the strat t^y by then began to ^aT>e 
certainly seemed aised at brlnpiag India a step closer to 
that goal# But that atrateny .^raia influenced in terra by 
a^ jush other l imiting factors aa the existing levels of 
Indiua nuclear and strategic teolmology und the sensitiveness 
of foreign coimtri«s, 
3haat r i ' s ear l ier response both to the Chinese 
advancement in nuclear f ield and to t^e demands for Indian 
nueloar policy weapons vas to r e i t e ra t e the Indian 
goveronents existing policy of not develop^ing niislear 
39» liijatia, n . ^^, p . 17. 
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weapons. A foPmar Simatrl aid reoalls that Prise Minister 
was tSStU'Iy tnTpotratt iio i^&^ik&fe^fmBat ot nuoXear weaiojas 
%,jhlch he believed war© I r r^evan t to India 's dafane© needs 
and woTild Imve lead to an unnecessary wast© of monciy, 
Shastrl onoo said 
"Destiite tho eoatimied threat of agToosion«»» 
Boveriiment of India v/ill contlnae to adhere tO|^ 
the decision not to go In for maolear tfaanons,^^ 
Ttmrovcr, aftor%farcl3 there tras a v is ible cfmano In the 
sovcmmeiit attitude* T-ds tns nanif cstefi on tlirae aepar^jto 
occasions on or before 27 ^ovssber* On the day the Priise 
I ' lnister latcrvoned diiring a hot Saiha. debate to t<^l a 
Jan Sangh 2iP not to qisote Bhabho oat of the content on the 
low cost of developing nuclear boiribs, Shastrl t?©nt oiat to 
say that he was not opposed to the develonment of nuclear 
sci«»© for peaceful purposes* But he was In favour of 
developing nuclear explosiveS| provided they were used for 
tt»9 tuonsling moving isountains and other such purposes* 
This was the f i r s t time that tho options were 
narrowed as the technology required for sush explosives i s 
only Bifti^inally different from that required for nueleor 
i»0* Oovemiaent of India, Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting Publications Division, Speeches of 
Prime Minister L«l Bahadur Shastrl , June ijCh^ May 
1965, (Dolhl, 1965). p* 109. 
M* Bhatia n. 22, pp. 15-19. 
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the second oooaslon /^ns the? ^ollowir^ veek durlrvg a 
v i s i t to London, Shantrl told ^cnimnllstn that he had 
dlsctissoc?. vl th the "ipitlsh Prim© Klnlster, Harold Vilsoa, 
the ;l4o*i of Qfifckinn a miol«mr guarantor from the* ^rent 
cjo'iers acainst the tlujoat of a nncl ar attao-c fstm Itn 
a^ightJoyrn, Hiiastri E^aat China ant^  Pfi*:lstaii« IMs c'lo^red, 
tbat u'aa:5trl's OovomciGfit tool: a rxjre roal ls t io a:^  roach as 
far as X:idia*c nticlGar rjolicy WAS corwerned, 
'i!hc tlilrd occasion oa 'filch tho govormeat chcsn^ cjd 
a-niToaoh xmc ovlfioat on 0 Jantiai*sr 1965, duping tho aiaiaal 
coQroj?orico of tho coiagresa narty in ^urgaTiur on that 
oecaslcMi ^ '^aiastj?! said '•! oaniiot say nnythinR about tho ftitiipe 
bat so Tar as oxst vtan&nt Trolley i s not to roanufacttar© the 
atom bomb btit to dsvolop nticl«^ir energy for neaceftCL 
ptarposen. 
His resenratlons ab' ut the futiire contrast®:! s^iar^ly 
vital t^hmt HehPu had said on the sas® subject five years ago. 
Addressing the ifational development Couacil on 1^ January 
1961 i^ehru bed said, "Since we are approaching a stage ^iion 
i t i s possible for us if ve direot our Clergies to that mA 
to make atoiaic weapons t o o , , , I s tate absolutaiy that under 
no olrcuBsteaoas v U l i#e do so whatever might happen, ^ 
If3, Thii ^ia^tm€Sm«Afl ^»>^iii ^ nmr Delhi, 15 January 1961. 
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ladla had alvays been threatened by Pakistan as Pakistan 
has always canasd trouble for India and has taken rallltary 
aids from USA inorder to talk with India from a position 
of strength. 
The %jnr td.th Pakistan altered Shastrl to the grim 
r ea l i t i ca oC tho oporati nai environment and aljao the 
l imitations or tho nuclear cmorgy beini^ user* for peacerul 
rjur-ioses, Shootrl a^mkeaed by the military stnlottent with 
Pakistan revised his vlG'?g on nuclear Issue, He shifted 
froQ a no-.i3C8nb position to In i t i a t e a policy of kee^iLag the 
nuclear option o -en. '1e ari^ roTred a nronosril by ^r, Bhabha 
for a Btfeterranean nunlear oxr^losion pr .^ect. 
Thus, by permitting that tho Indian sc ient i s t s rdg^^t 
be allowed to develop •neac<:^ 'uQL nutslear explosives VWJB 
Shastri expressed his williagtiess to alloxf the developient 
of Indian nuolear teehnology upto the point where i f and ^ e n 
neoessazy soient ls ts tiouad be able to switch over to weapons 
production in a relat ively short space of tli&e« Confirmation 
of th is approaoh was available on 8th January 1965| whai he 
agreed to keep open a weapons option for the future. Thus, 
Shastrl to some extent was prepared to deveop PNE. shastr l 
after the Indo Pakistan war of 1965 was prepared to some 
extent to consider the developsent of Indian nuelear 
3 . 
explosives \diioh represented one end of fche speotrtm of 
nucleel^ poBstb^^ltiesv At t ^ other end was a possible 
decision to i n i t i a t e a crash progrouaae for developing 30 to 
ho Plutonian ^%r heiuis for delivery against a nuclear armed 
eaon^y l ike China, Tbe construction of nuclear weapons 
systeci dfifnands the abi l i ty to master Pm equally Drocosses* 
(a) To develOT) toolmological tirocessos, 
(b) Develomeat of a EsuitablG delivery syst«a, 
^ e Indian lirforc© a t that titse Ixad medimn range 
onnberrn. hon'bQrQ botight from Britain wliich ^mn sultatile to 
carry nuoloar bomba to targots in Pakistan and not in China. 
Titus I t tahoim a reislletio approach s ime Indian fierceIved a 
threat from Pakistan develo-'inn nuclear ifleapons. I t tlmt 
tiaie to contain China \mB useless as i t did not have a 
suitable delivery system, '^  Thus, i t shows that India had 
an eye tm Pakistan as a possible t!ireat to i t s security. 
India was not threatened by the Chinese bomb as China wants 
India to go nuclear. Chinese have not of course specifically 
endorsed Indian nuslear prograaae, but at the same time, they 
have not ooeimitted adversely on the nuclear debate in India 
T5erhap« ^ t h an aim to contain the USA and Soviet Union". 
The question v;hether India should go in for nuclear 
¥>* Iha t i a n. 22, pp. 15-19. 
*^* o ^ S f s b i n g k a r "Nuclear non proliferation", Ofalna ^fttirl) 
Vol. IV, no. \ July*Aupuit, (Hew Delhi), p. % 
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weapons has been vldely debated since the Chinese entry into 
the nuslear club vrfien China entered the niaolear club vith a 
twenty Klloton atomic device in October 196if," the g«ieFal 
reaction ^ms to discuss the event as of no great consequence 
as of what use is an atom bcmb in the absence of an effective 
delivery system, which the most Anerlcans observers considered 
as being too complex and expensive to be within China's 
immediate reach. President 's Johnson's radio and television 
broadcast reflected such sentiments. But China wQit ahead in 
the follo\d-ng years and exploded a fusion bomb containing 
thermo nuclear material. A fission bomb containing thermo-
nuclear \m3 exploded in December 1966, 
In June 1967 China triggered i t s f i r s t hydrogen bomb 
and in 1969 China's underground tea t s showed i t s determination 
to go ahead wltii the development of both strategic as well as 
tac t ica l nuclear weapons progracuae. The situation of China 
was quite different due to the natuife of the Chinese regljue. 
The regime was possessed by an intensely ethoeentric and 
expansionist nationallsmi. I t had a dogmatic Ideology which 
added fuel to nat ional is t ic f i r e and gave i t much strategic 
and tac t ica l sk i l l , Inspite of i t s policy of lsolat lon, the 
regime had earned much respect in the world as i t had proved 
i t s determination to accumulate and use power and to pursue 
W. ABI H fteetor " O d i n ' s Nuelear Boliftv", The Indiim JailFST" 
II» no, 3 , Juiy*Sept«Bber ly Vol. XXXII 
r97t, W«r D«lliiJ, p. 3k9. 
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an iiid«p«rid«nt policy in d«flane« of all the graat povera 
of the vorld. It created a &\kv93td situation for India as 
<Htlntt irm a wmltmm^ jio^^emtm Ivrgest iMxm i^ isy i»t l l l H i a 
in the %iorld and the onl^ atom bomb in Asia. And that too 
close to India's borders. But s t i l l India did not feel any 
threat from the side of China bat i t felt a saise of 
inseourity as Pakistan was posing a threat to Indians 
security and national integrity,due to i ts massive induction 
of arras m& aEanunitlon which India had learned Tdth 
©xncsrieacc that such arms i^ udd rK)t be used against any 
country 
coi3Eunist/but acainst India, Shastrl %^ \mB the Prime 
Finlsster then stressed the point that India i^ ould not go all 
out to produce nuclear %t©apon3. In his message to the IJhird 
International Conference on the peaceful uses of /\tomlc energy 
on 31 August - 9 September 196*^ ^ hfid said that, India believed 
that atomic tsiergy t^uld only be used for peacefiiL purposes 
and the welfare of husianity and had resolved to use i t only 
la tiliis manner as far as i ts oim efforts were coneernftd* But 
Shastri wms real is tie and narrowed the ontions in ease India 
needed it* 
Kashmir had always been a bone of contention between 
India and Pakistan* And this had always been a hindranoe in 
developing frieolly relations between the two countries* For 
ao. B»| rwt*^m a|ft|f jijfifl the W»b^ Indian Conga 11 of «nyld 
Affftirsj Voi.^ra, Uo, 1, Oiuiuafy^ Mareh 1965 (Aiia Hoaae 
nm t^mMt I965)t P. If9# 
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India Kashmir is not a political roiaiatte and to tolerate 
any ohsillenge to Kaslmis ta to etoMwi^ £sdia*® ^tagvity 
and Soirareignty, First Pakistan gava assistance to the 
trlbals invaders in Jammi and Kashmir and tried to get 
Western Iieln to challenge India* T^ ut as i t did not achieve 
i ts objective, i t decided to pro<luoe nuclear i?earons, to 
threaten India as Pakistan rmn tinder the iBoression that 
India trtts ooiacltted. to the weaoeful uses of rtt^ slQar energy, 
Doriac the 1965 vrar India cautiously avoided any involvenent 
in East Bmgal, rowever, Chtoa insnit© of this did display 
i t s desire to fiah in troulalG waters* hy issuing an 
ultisatma to India 'Aicsh hotiever proved iaelTective siiice 
by thcai President A^ uh had heen scared into agreeing to a 
cease fire. After the %!ar Pakistan had a regular flow of 
50 tanks, planes and other weapons from China, Pakistan i t 
seoas was eager from t^e very heginning to manufacture 
nuelear \ieapons to deter India in an ettsmpt to rule 
Kastasiir* 
After Indo-Pak war in 1965 India itself in a very 
a^vard tituation as pressure mounted <»i nUd maim^ed 
Shastri for the aanufacture of nuelear weapons. He 
finally, gave Bhal^, the zr^ien light not an all out 
oowwitttent to nuAlear weapons but for the developioent of 
50* Dr.n 47,p 552.; 
• y y y * I Hljiii I 11.11 I IIII111 n|i I. j n MtJi 
t 
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p«fte«fuX auel««r oxplosive. By th« timei the lodlans 
already had th« ciros reactor and th« raprooassing plant 
£t Tramtmy ail dav«lope4 witho^ safeguaeda Jiod undar the 
eloak of peacafial nuclear Research, Lai Bahadur Shaatrl 
tmllke %hru could not and did aot seek to bind the 
fi2ture generations to his mind, H© told tho Lok Sabha m 
the TfovanhfflT 196*f, teat his governcseat policy was laot static 
and if required i t X'^ovBL^ change according to oircuiastances. 
•iut, as fate xioUld have been Bhabhu's estimate 
proved vildly opttolstlc* He and Lai Bahadur jliastri both 
died, "T#iru*e daufrliter Indira Gandlii tools over as the 
Prime Klnlster of India, 
Indira Gandhi can© to power after Shastri's death. 
In enunciating her poliey I'ro Gandhi broufht in the security 
issue as early as In 1967, Sh© maintained that the 
ectaitry*s d^«ice and security 'would be paramount 
ocnsideratioii in tee foiwilations of governments, i^ u^clear 
Polloy vhioh vas under constant review, 
HeanidiSle, tee tftiited states and Pakistan had 
div«?geiit goals and interests in coming together in an 
allianoa, Fw Pakistan the nain oonsideration in forging 
ffte^<-fM^ V0I4 
65i p. 1"H# 
. 3 oo» 1 (Jaipur Jaimary 19^) 1 pp. 67-82, 
3 
a security relationship with V3 was Its obsession with 
the perceived threat from India and Its desire to procure 
lay means of an alliance substantial economic aid to 
accelerate economic deveLopmait and military assistance to 
Improve its defence capability vls-a-vls India, Besides, 
the tJ,S. was expected to exert pressure on India to resolve 
the Kashmir question to Islamabad's satisfaction, 
Washington on the other hand was guided by its global 
strategy of containing its communist Adversaries China and 
the Soviet Union and to that end found Pakistan, with its 
strategic location at the doorstep of China to be 
strategically important for bases and listening posts, "^  
Pakistan in reality wanted to be strengthened against India. 
It needed modern arms in an appreciable quantity to counter 
balance India's poi^ er position. It could not have acquired 
the arms with its own financial resources. Hence, it 
eagerly Joined the Western defence alliances, which enabled 
it to obtain arms easily and also to get support on 
Kashmir issue, 
Indira Qandhi understood the situation well and 
also realized that American arms to Pakistan was a great 
threat to India because in the past American arms were used 
agal st none but against India in the context of the 
?'^ . Raahmi Jain^ ffl-^fl^^ Relatifflag^  10l4.7>1Q8'^ ^ (Radinnt 
Publishers, (Kew Delhi, 1983)i p. 18, 
3a 
Pakistani I Intdation of solviitg th« question of Kashmir 
tltfo^gli l^d u»« of forooa 
Th© as»»Bptioa of the office of president of iMlted 
States by P-lchard Mixion in 1969, raised high hopes in 
Pakistan for iKproved relat ions with ^^ashington, m& for tho 
Pakistan's request of railitary assistance, 
t'rs* Gandhi voiced her concern t!iat the '^ iiaerican 
arms %ro\ild he osecl against India and #jiich eventually 
ha.ipened in t971^*.^en Pakistan launched a desperate nove of 
attacking Indian a i r f ie lds in tlorthorn and tiestem India 
on 3 December 1971. India and i t s people were stimncd. In 
her broadcast to tlie nation in Dec^ber 1971» '^J?s Indira 
Gandhi stated t 
"I speak to you at a moment of great per i l to 
our country • • • w e are a peace loving country* 
But tM kno r^ that peace cannot l a s t if ve do 
not guard our dceiocracy and our vay of l i f e tie 
have stood for peace but peace i t se l f has to be 
defended. Aggression must be net and the people 
d IMim v i l l ieeet i t with fort i tude detensina* 
t ion and vith diseipline and utmost unity**. 5M> 
USA eane forward to ass is t Pakistan, '«^hite House 
Offise to harbour strong suspioicms about Indian designs of 
disBieraburlng Pakistan, 
In 1971 var probably about the time India %KUI seeking 
"-'Bftrilifr^ fff*r 'mil '^ '^ i^ ^ ^ "^' '^ ^-*'*^^ -^ 
Biteimftl ATfcU t^y a ^ t « of l a i i a inmt Delhi, Deeenber 1971) < 
3il 
dxternaX mssurftneos against Chinese interreation, that 
Indira Qandhi decided in favour of strengthening India's 
naelear options by allowing the Atonic energy ostahlishasat 
for an underground test« Tbveveri i t was maintained that 
the test condiwted at Pokharan in !'^ 197**- was for peaceful 
purposes* 
thQ explosion came frofii deep inside an I^shaped 
trench in the vast xmstos of India's Bajasthm Desert, Jhe 
blast gliook the surroisiding scrubland forcing a large 
hillock to rise early from the desert sands. According to 
Indian Scientists, the yield resistored fifteen Irllotons 
(close to the si2e of the HlrosMaa exolosion) and %ms 
produced by a ®sallGr nuclear device Ende of Plutonium, 
fhe test took nlace on l-iay 18, 197^, at 8:0.5 i» the 
fflorning. The shock i^vos shattered all the standard 
iiBQges of India as one of the worlds largest democracy and 
the land of Hehru and Mahatma Gandhi, the alter of non-
violenee and non ^igmnent, and pious calls for universal 
nuclear disanaaaent. It vas also the hone of the desperately 
poor and diseased and yet the one that had laost pinned i t s 
hopes for the future on n^lear power and the promise of the 
si^ >p08edly peaoefui atom. And now this same India \ms also 
the first of the less dev^oped countries to test a nuclear 
•*( ?T?»fiirn;f:iii!r~\ (Ori«Bt Paperl^ aeke, (Hew o^lhi, 1983), pp» 15' 
li) 
dtfvlco* 
Xh&^ualea£ b las t in the doserts oS Hajastliaa oa 
I8th May 197»^  was a protsi achiovaaeat of India ' s ntioloar 
seientlatsft Tim yoifld oommimity knew foi* somo time, that 
India had nov aoautred suTflciont kno%i how and abi l i ty to 
tpigg^? off a nuclear esoloslon and succefsofully KQTS© 
nuclear bomb. I t had a tjredietable ropurousslons in 
diff©r©nt par ts of th© t»nd» I t \>mn cr l t lolaod by tho 
'Tnited States as a threat to the world seourity» Franc© 
congratiilated India, TBSa, nufoliahod the Comjaunlque of 
Atomic energy de^ r t aen t xjithout embellistoeat and the 
Bri t ish trere subdued. 
ilcmeirer, i t %ms not Intr lnaically surprising of a 
nation idth second la rees t population In the world, so 
stratftgieally situated as India having a defence budget % h^ich 
Hor years has been the f i f th largest SA the ^ r i d after 
that of big and medium poirsrs now feat the need to 
unravea. the •«••<»• seerets of the atom* The United States 
^ i ^ holds the reeord for having made the greatest nmSi&e 
of atBiosplMrio and underground t e s t s along with soviet 
union raised a hue md cry over the t e s t and questioned 
the allegedly sesret designs behind i t . The Canadian 
GovernBwnt reaeted very harshly indeed, Th^ suznised 
41 
that the plutonltaa could have been dravn from nowhere also 
hot from that "buUt from Canadian assistance. Japan vas 
56 the next to ^ i a the voiees of ^Jotest*^"^ 
Naturally Pakistan was frightened and c r i t i c ized 
the explosion as a threat to i t s security and national 
in tegr i ty . Pakistan was disappointed as the blast took 
place at a short distance from Pakistan's Eastern Borders, 
Although India had declared that the nuclear blas t 
was only for peacefu:^ purposes and X-T&B not a preltide to 
acquisition by India for a nuclear arsenal i s not 
surprising that Pakistan should fear to have a nuclear 
n^ghbour with ^om i t s relat ions have been strained through 
57 
out the post-indep«nd«ice period,'^' 
Sidia' s Pokharan peaceful nuclear explosion of an 
atomic device in May 197 -^ was considered by Z.A. ffiiutto as 
upsetting the balance of power in the subcontinent and as a 
grave threat to Pakistan's seeuzlty, Pakistan, he remaiked 
wotUd not sueeunb to nuclear blackmail and would not accept 
Indian doninati<»i of the subcontinent and would not compromise 
58 i t s position on the Kashmir issue. In wake of India 's 
peaeeful nuclear explosion Bhutto adopted a multi-pronged 
approach. F i r s t l y , he soiight some sort of guarantee against 
56. Pi«rre M. Qalloi t , "Indian Kuolear Bxploslon and India 's 
g^itPiiww | ^ t « » f^r^ ISLmvart^ JAI-DBC 1975, Vol. XXI7 
57. liAttI»lBay»» ramiji or t a | i i *a 'F0 | i ;ga F^llifflr, 
iijmm B«i and S ^ . Dalhl, 198»*), p. m* 
5S« ^mm Kha l l sa i^Pak i s tan -^<ne nakiag of a nuclear power* 
l i l i i l minmrt ^a» 1978, p. 589. 
42 
th« nuelear thr«at pos«d by India from all th« big povers 
or at Ifiiast from USA, saooodly, i t sdught inter national 
iftu£tda? weapons rrm aone (tiWFZ) in South Asia. Thtrdly, 
Pakistan wantod USA to l i f t the arms embargo and provida 
sophisticated anns to PaScistan to defend itself from 
59 India, 
In tho 1970*s and mrt ioular ly af ter India 's 
Bokliaran estplosion in I'ay t97^ Pakistan intensified i t s 
60 
nndear prograraiao. The decision 4^as niotlvated by the 
national oecurity requirenents to oafegnard i t s security 
vlG»a-vln tho neroeived threat from India, ibreover, UIA 
%ms neither rertdy to provide a nuclear gnarimtoe ftor 
trilling to nupply substantial conventional arns to 
Pakistan* 
Wa&a India condiwtod her l^kharan tes t in aaMy 
dvems of Rajasthani the Western ^^rld showed outbursts of 
61 
anger Canaida cut off nudear aid to India. Pakistan 
ootlLd not hold i t s anger. Bvit s t i l l India under l ^ s . 
OaiKtii ««at ahe«d for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
After 19^f nndear esplosion l^ India, Miutto 
59* ^ «lnf n» 53| Pt W* 
60. Zalnay Xhal ind, **Pflki8tan and the Bomb'*, Survive^ London. 
fiov*Ots, 1979. p. 2m» 
61. ^ggj^ty^ (Chandigarh}, 3 February t976. 
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tA% Umt India had indaed mbarkad on a weapons progrmme 
vlth Its niaclear eacploslon and that It was time for 
Paklstaa to jsMu^ h fbr taehnologlas and £aeillt&o& ^ r the 
hoffib pfogramme. The acciulsitlon of the reproeestlng 
facility he hoped would open the plntonixxa road to weapons 
capacity. It was mainly dta© to Bhutto*s persist^t efforts 
that the P«ikl8tan Instittite of Huclear Science and Teohnology 
CfirK3TKIl) ^MB set i^ and negotiations for the Karachi 
Hnolear Power Plant KAHOPP started. As a Foreign Minister 
to Ay lib Khan Bhutto had iirged the sanction of Rs» 300/-. 
62 
million for setting up cf a reprocessing plant. Even as 
early as those days he seemed to have harboured Id^is for 
Pakistan striving for nuclear capacity and the reprocessing 
plant was to him the syuftjol of capability. 
Due to the Kashmir question and the nuclear issue, 
Indo«Paklstan relatimis have been as cold as had and as 
stagnant as they were before. It is true that there has 
not 90 far been an anaed elash after 1971» but s t i l l India 
azid Pakistan ware at war of words with one another, India 
has alwasfs protested against Pakistani nuelaarisation 
progranne which is a threat to i ts seexirity. The lifting 
of of «sbargo by the United States on arms supplies to Pakistan and 
Pakistanis ^forts to tap Petro-dollars to build up her war 
62« Hal* Gatu D^ K, Palik, FK3 HMboodirl j; 
taOlt ( m a t , nmt Delhi, 1979), p. i% 7^"% fi'nrnynifVTni. 
maeMnes hai'e nade the slttiation fiirther t«iis#, 
programme of f skis tan to pToc9@d» He franod t^ his 
eeonoBic poXleies b\]t the fl&w in his poXlelea were that 
i t was defeoee oriented* Along with the eoonomlo 
progrsgam© fm launched a sasslve plan to turn the oonntry^s 
^mied foro^f the best fighting aaohenlo in Asia* ^ 
30C3O after the took over as the Prime Kinister of 
Pakistan, Bhutto reorganized Pakistan's Atoode Bhergy 
CoEBtssion oncl gave th i^a clear dircietlons for preparing a 
programme for rapid nnolear technology* Accordingly 
Pakistan atomic energy Chief MtMlr Ahmad Khaa prepared a 
plan for corr.raiaslonlng 1? nuclear reactors with a total 
capacity <^  9*400 W* So as to provide 3D pereent of the 
countries ^eotrlcal generating capacity h^ the turn of the 
century* This plan also catered for the eoisBissioning of 
a fuel reproe^sing and plutoniuB recovery plant vith 
Vwmoh Aaalstaniie* Although the entire programe vas 
secBingXy geired for energy production and other peaceful 
apiilleatioas the public In this country suspected that the 
pregraBfflo vas really a cover for dev«a.oping cospetenee and 
63* SMUfil iai4 iBid Sf JJ^muf *^ alclt%an8 Defoaee Potential'*, 
agllm.l|fa|M,aiT>ttrl| April t976, Vol* XXV, so* }f, 
6^ « Sieeiiii S M I M I I ^ niinilinf BlMii (Karsehl) Pakistan, 
» Nov., fW* 
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and facllltlGs for w©ap(xis production. This is clear 
65 from Hiutfer*is owa teatsajnent meSe from Mrs ptt&sm ^ #14» 
Since the Indian nuclear •xplosion Paklstsn has 
openly escpressed intirest in sMisitive nuclear technology* 
Pakistan entered in agreecient t^ ith Franc© in 1975 for the 
delivery of a reprocessing facility \4iich collapsed in 
1978 hut Pakistan Imd nev^theless many of the necessary 
tools for a nnclear y^eapons option ifith information 
gathered hy a Pakistani Scientist at the ^ronean enrich-
Kcmt complex at Alisela in tho tJetherlanfis and throngh a 
complex networl: of clandestine procnrement deals with 
Enropean muSi Tforth Jteerlcan producers* ifot fever than 
fotir sensitive nrujlear prograaame were set up and are in 
various stages of development. She half finished French 
reprocessing plant at Cha^a is complete, A pilot facility 
for upaniiaa enrichment i s nearing completion, at Sihala and 
66 
a large facility at Kahuta is progressing veil. Bhutto's 
desire for nuelMFisatloa was due to his feelings that 
balanoe of pover since 1971 hwl changed much in favour of 
67 India and that Pakistan vfOid.d not he able to balance i t . 
TIais Bhutto vas all out to adjust this biaanoe of power, 
65. ^ f i k a r KLJ Bhutto, It A m aaiatolliflt CVikaa, 
ll«v Delhi, 1979), p. 223* 
67* H t^ fllilf Bill (^ vv DalhiJ, Ffbruary 2, 1975* 
4u 
with the help of Chinese and Aiiieriean and Arab aids* He 
received aid of (I 610 milXlcHi) froiQ Opec cotJKitriea than 
froo! the vest (S 539 ffliUioii) during 1973-^ . ^ « Fusllm 
members of Opec gave Pakistan o i l eoeeessloas. 
During Ford period teerioan assistaiKse to Pakistan 
was modest but choked an upr^ rard trend. The aasuaptloa of 
presidency by Jium^ Carter in 1977,inade situation diff icul t 
for PaMetaa because of Car ter ' s unfavourable vlmia on arms 
sale* Carter administration realized that Pa^stan was on 
a path of weapon canabillty aM suspended aid to Pakistan 
in Upril 1977. Poliistan's destiny prevented BlMtto in 
achieving h is md. In July t977f a military coup led to 
Bhutto* s removal and brought into power a military 
government headed by General Fohammad Zia-ul Haq, But 
Pakistan continued i t s nuclearisation prograsme there after, 
India also saw a change in leadership during the 
same tSsie. Mrs* Gandhi was defeated and Janata Party under 
the Prime Ministership of Morarji Desai eane to power in, 
Mareh 1977* 
The nuclear Policy of the Janata Party had four 
strands t 
• India would u t i l i z e enargy for peaceful purposes 
,19-2^ liaiwh 1977| Pm 22* rrvrrm 
4 7 
oAly mid vottld not nanufaetture zmeleftr weapons tsid«r any 
cirounstaziGes* 
. India w<na.d not sign the Woo-Prollf iratlon Treaty 
unl^s th© Quolear weapon povers renounce their veapcms, 
- Inspection of autonomously eKmtrolled or domestically 
established nuclear faci l i t ies i^ ould not be perraltted. 
- And, nuclear esjploslons tiotild not be conducted 
69 
and their utility i s cuestloaed, 
Tho first three strands of the Janata* s govcrmsit 
to 
nuclear policy eorreeponded/^o previous government 
poaitions, but a sharp differerteeg Is evident in i t s 
attitude to^mrds peaceful nuclear explosions, Indira 
Gemdhl had kept open the possibility of further tests 
although she onoe stated that a seeond nuclear explosion 
vould only be held, "vAi&a. the need for a peaceful 
•sperlneQt Is established,'^ This aspect of Janata Party 
HAS surily oritleizad, 
the nuclear policy of Janata Party was enunciated 
bjr Morar^ l Deaal on March 23, 1977* He said »iat India 
would uti l ise atoBic enecgy for peaoeful ptirposes only 
fiQ- P . B , t^9%^ Yndimn I f c j ^ l ^ ftml^^ f.. g p W < , , . > t , n,At•^ 
^ 2««ta*f F o ^ p ^ ^ l w C f r o i r » « w Oelhl, 1979), p. 60-61, 7C)« ^ ^%V^ (Kudfat) 7 »ay 19%« 
48 
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waA i«ouId in no eire\aitt«iio«8 nanuf aetvBP* iraelMT vMipona. 
Thm Mi»rarjl l>»a«i lik« Nthru ims also agitlnst India 
aohifivli^ £»ie3l«ar «€Eip&^ili^ Iso^todmswnmilmtp 
ii^ eapons* HuoXearisatloa to him v&s a proeaas hampering 
•ooziomlc developaant as i t t^ otild have divartad funds to 
auolaarisation piogrmmes t-?hich ootild have been uaed 
other-dls©. On April 26, 197^, the than 1>af«ice l^iniatar 
Shri Jagjivan H«!i raspcmding to a calling Attention t^tion 
<Ki the r©po«»t€d btjlld up of wms hy Pakistan said la 
Ba^ ya Saihha that India vas contimilng the ntielcar policy 
dov^lop^ by previous governEent ^ ieh was a rational 
policy, n© further said that India would carry on i t s 
progr i^me of nuclear energy res^irch ar^ developiaent for 
72 
peaeefiil purposes* 
During the Janata period, US threatened to stop the 
supply of fuel to the Tarapur atomic pokier reactor, 
Enriohed uraniun vas received with increasing difficulties 
ffoc tiSiU this was being done to pressurise India into 
poaiticiis ^^m options wotad be jeopardised. USA 
threatened to stop s^ply taoless India, accepts full 
scope safeguards on all her nuclear faci l i t ies . Atal 
Bihari Tajpsyee, the then minister of external affairs, 
72. S & O Q S j k t t l i A t ^PP^ 26* 1979. 
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7ta«d o^ iAsp#etioa of eif«ry nuclear faeility at the priea 
for continued uranlna supplies* Morarji Dosai saggosted 
tmt^mct&vm mwm^iiwm^m^nmmw Hitsuamoiii 
subJQoted to Intornatlo];^ inspection if the simper povers 
decide not to mdertake naolear teste not add to their 
stoekpile of atomic weapons and agree to eliminate their 
ftticlear arsenals, there w^e ohaages in India's naclear 
policy since Janata Parts? came to po^er hot the chaises did 
not confirm to a set pattern contradictions heo»e raore 
glarii^ mid there vas m coherenco in the policy. It 
tinted to cive up the nuclear option forever but at tho same 
tlae oppos^ the -^ ery concept of nuclear anas control, 
V&eimpn during ttie S'anata period th^e m^s no serious 
thinking on the policy* Acquiring enriched uraniu© for 
Tarapur Plant seemed to he the only aiu of India's nuclear 
policy* There was no indication of the Janata Party 
Go¥«RiiBent having identified national goals and priorities 
i& this sphere, Janata government maintained a seelilanee 
of oontimiilQr In India's nuclear poliey as in the foreign 
policy in general. However^  the changes brought abottib 1K$ 
i t were nore profound «i^ the oontlnoi^ naintid^ned less 
real* Horerji l)eeai urns against peaeeful naslear eoeplosions, 
C^  30 S^ %« I97?t he told the Council on Boireign relations 
" " %!• Iff ^m > ^ Jmy* 
. f U 
In Hew y6rk» It i s our aolmn roaolvo that whattfer the 
rest of thfi \iorM sa^ ^j va wHX nater us a atoiale aaargy 
for military purposas. 
'Sb& Janata Governsent had chaXlangad tha vary 
concept of nuclear anns control. A change uas aff ©ot©4 on 
18 rfoveraber 1977$ in India's policy towards nuclear arms 
control a chnngo that oay oertaiiSly be characterizeti as 
fonclanental and of greater magnitude than the one made in 
1967, StroQsinc the present government's vier'S on regional 
denuclearisation, Bas Dhan told the first coiamltte© of the 
tJ.'l, Gendfal Aosmbly i 
Regionalisation of the concept of the tforld 
free of nuclear weapons will be not only 
Inconsistmt with our global approach to this 
question but i t will also divert from a 
universal to a sub-regional or regional 
concept. In our opinion, regional nuclear 
weapon free zones will not help to combat the 
nuclear threat to the %iorld at large. 76 
Itorarji Desai was against peaceful nuclear explosion. 
He oatagorieally told the moabers of the parliament in a 
meeting of the consultative committee of the Parliament 
attaohed to ^ e Department of atomic Sfiergy space and 
eleitronics that as long as he was the Prime !^inister, he 
77 
wotild not go for the bomb. 
(Hew f>tihi) l i 6eioWr t 9 ^ . 
ap, inm Delhi) 20 iteveraber 1977» 
THev D^Dii) May 8, 1979» 
bi 
B^ Iforarji Dasai did not rmmin in Offlea for 
long and so did the Janata governm«ttt| (Sharan Stngh took 
dxsrgv to liead tim oaroti^ nrr gorvraiioiit*. 
After 1977f how«v©r, tha Woatern opinion had 
veered roimd to th® view that although India continued 
to resist to the aticlear non-proliferation treaty, i t 
wotild not mako nucl^ir ireapons. fhis %«s mainly hscause 
India's then prime minister '^orar3i Desai had often 
deelared that h© xms totally opposed to the idea of 
ntiliciac uuclear technology for other than peaceful uses. 
His sincerity xmo iiot doubted in any quarter, 
Hot^vor, 1^ 1978, i t xms clear that Paklstnn had 
been tjorklng sGCJ?otly since 1972, to build plants for 
producii^ veapono, grade uranium and plutonimu 
Hence shortly after assuciing office Charan sirmh 
deolared in his mesaar.© to the inwple on August 5» 1979 
that in ease Pakistan produces nuelear weapons, India 
Bay have to reconsider i ts nuelear policy. The interim 
governeeat of Charan Singh app^ured more sympathetie to 
tlie pro«boab lobby. It 's defence minister C* Subrtnanyuai 
otttliaed India's defence strategy in Oetob«r 1978 and 
said that India vouid have to chalk out a carefully 
l%id«out oo«ra« in the stofny waters of a hostile 
0^ 
&t^ pjmtlOQid environaent, Heforine to nuelesyr veapoiM 
h« said thmt in the oomlag ydsrs IfieUa nil l have to ii>ak« 
certain deoisions rocarding i t s nooXear policy. 
He further said, I am not naiye dzx>i]gh to declare 
on t>^alf of all future generations and governaents that 
India wiXl not make naclear weapons* '^Sooh declarations" 
do not imch sirnificanse and merely constitute a reflection 
of egoistical tendencies in the persons maiking the deelara-> 
78 tion'*, 3t3t Gharan Singh's govemaient coald not remain 
in Office for laag. 
Ifho US non«T>rolif eration Act came into force on 
March 10, t978. India felt the change ^en for the first 
time, ifuclear Regta.atory Coffioission failed to sanction the 
export of enriched uranitm for the Tarapur Atomic Bower 
Station en April 20, 1978* %e ooianission spilt evilly on 
the questicm and passed the hi^k to president Carter and the 
oonsress, Oki April 27, the Presidwit waived aside the 
requlreDent of aeeeptftose of full scope safeguaids tv 
India as he was oompetent to do luider the Act. On July 12, 
WAS the last veraaining hurdle overoone %^ en the House of 
representatiires rejeeted a action of disapproval which had 
sought to CffwrMm the presidential order. The Act was 
78* (ht^ n* 66y p» i% 
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8i«n«d in 1963 for 30 years. The Act, bovwwr, 
ractittlrad India to aeoept fal l ee«p© sitf e g ^ ^ by 10 
3«pt«Bb©r 1977» But India %i»s not ready for Inspection, 
iteserlca*s delaying and denying oonslgmnents of fuel for 
the tarapur Plant by Postponing the joint deter®Inatlon 
signed in 1963 was to put a pressure on Ir^la t-fcleh 
to Orleans felt vas heading tovards nuclear compatablllt^r, 
Tarapur ran below capacity ar^ the power r^iictor Fuel 
Heprocesslng Plant was foinsed to bo Idle. 03 or»posltlon 
to any developing country aoqulrlnc tiie technology for the 
separation of plutcmlani and construction of fast breeder 
reactors iiad stiffened. 
Soon after the HPS, Indira Gandhi 0€©e back to 
pOTsrer in January I98O, serious efforts 1»egan to be oade 
to make India's audear policy more realistic, To her, 
the preseirvatioa of the unity and Integrity of the ootntry 
Mms a »9)0W9A nisaioii, to uhleh everything else had to be 
stftordlnated* ^mmr making any compromises lAiere national 
seeurlty was eotu»emed, she %fas acutely conscious of the 
need for nodemlaation of India's defense forces to deal 
vlth the new ehalleaces posed by the deterioration in the 
seeurlty envlfonnent, 
Meinwhfl<i despite the varloae set baeks in the 
mrrTtgUn'^ L 1,8^ Wmmuai^ "^idia»« Feriftan Pellflyw 
'_ ' Vol. 6, no* S MaftthvApPil t< 
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pjpograniae for th» incr«asdd production of nticlear pov&t 
India M^ not mm& i t s stani 0it t&o Sarapur agra^estt* 
In t980| It asserted Its claims on the IJ^ vS* noro 
vlgoriottsly. New D^hl firmly linked India's acceptance 
of lAES safeguards on the facil it ies at larapur with U,S, 
supplies of fu€a for the efficient m& oontimious operation 
of TAPS. An el€Eaent of impatimce was visible vdiea only 
one of the t ^ shipffimts licensed and approved in 
SeptfiEibor 1980 was delivered by the tf.a. President Reagon 
«as against nuolear exports to countries which were not in 
the U.S» security syst^a. It beeame evident In l?8t, that 
circumstances have outdistanced the 1963 agreement and 
that keeping i t alive %iould be useless, ^Mm. Ka?s. Gandhi 
visited united states of America in July 1982, the Reagan 
a^lsinistration anooisiced an agre^aent to end the 
Qontroviursy over Tarapur* fhe resp<m8ibility for 
r»»supplying Taps Tarapore Plant vith low grade soriehed 
uraniw iiat pasMd fron U,S, to France. India aeoepted 
the traaafer bat refused to consider any additional 
safeguards* 
during Hrs« Gandhi's reglae India took a hard line 
at BMtings of Oiaamneot CooBission in Geneva, India 
uttfttad tha nuolear pdvers to aafee^ tittrd the saoixritiy of 
Q»«iilan«s threataoad by a povar having iiiMd,ear iiaapmia 
0 J 
Oftpabilltgr. India also did xnot sign NPT on three grotmds* 
(a) There iif&s imbalance of obligations betveen naolear 
oJoA QonHiticleQr powers* 
(b) Xliere rM& inadeqtaate security gtiarantees «Bad there 
im© &a ©leaeat of discrisiaation in the development of 
peaceful nticlear explosions* 
KeaafMle Psd i^stan intensified i t s noslearisatioa 
T>rograf3i3e» IJtoo chaiwsan of Paidatan*o Atonio Ehergy 
Coiasisslon Itimir MmoSL disclosed that Pakistan %Jould have 
the nnolmr pokier plants by coKDletiag the constrootion of 
a six reactor complox at Chashisa i/ith a combined outimt of 
i*000 megmmtts by t980 and the constrtwtion of aaothor nine 
do 
tOOG jsegatmtts and aevea BOO megaimtts resKstors by 1980* s, 
fhe uhited States began to doubt Pakistan ntseleor 
intentions and disoonraged Ps^istan frots ptirehasing nticlear 
ftiil reprocessing eqoipiQent from France that eonld be used 
to «eqt;dre nuclear capability. United States allayed its 
fear and extended political support to Pakistan seeing to 
ftdLfill i t s denands for conventional weapons especially 
airerafts* Deposits of uraniun have been found noted in 
&itgil»l>«ra|0)iazi Khan and Southern Punjab* For the 
U London, U April 1^%,p* %. • :/^-» •''Ti rr^ rTpi/TfTfT':!-, f re^m. 
v)b 
ox^faction of uranluBJ, a pilot plant td.th a oapaoit^ r of 
100 ppts^a a day has be^s sate tip ta I.iaior©, ifeik on a 
fuel falarleatlon plant ^dth Canadian asslstanco was 
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prograssine* ^v» ^^ tmlr Ahmad Kh®n an ardent advocate of 
an ambitions nticlear povar progranaa© is doing his titraost 
to help Pcfclfjtan to a vaapoia capatJllltles. 
Indira Gandhi fnily roall?.od that Pakistan 
m^eorlsatlon progranma was not peacafiH. She ropeatedly 
voiced her concern that It ^as a threat to Inclla*s seonrlty 
as India Imd !iad t\m blttor experloncas tjlth l^akistan. 
After 1980 reports of Pakistan's Impending acquisition of 
a miclear tyeapoas capability were t4.dely elrei3(latGd In 
India* Xhough Krs, Gandhi's government did not react 
harshly and appeared to accept President's Zia-dl Haq's 
atatascnts of peaeeftO. Intent, Pttblio opinion was certainly 
coved in favour of meeting weapons with weapcMis. Changes 
began te appear in India's nuclearisation programe. 
Mr8« Gandhi govertesnt tried to aequlra anau^ oapabillty 
for varloiia dafenee taiica to protect the Indian territory 
from attack by Pakistan to defend Indian Institutions 
^thout aurrendar&ng har autonony lay domination on 
dapandanea on aithar Soviet tfeiion or USA adequate 
SI 
parfOABtfioa of all tiiesa tasks dananded a bro«l ooneept of 
^« fijlit and lltaboadivi n* eii p. 20« 
5 / 
«M oGommia polleies* This lead to QmbigciS.tios in India 
India's atteloap poliey, sh© hardly realised that fetoe lias 
8li03Pt TOT her. She ^as asiassinatad on Octoher 31, 198*** 
by a dtastaifdly md traaehciwms Act. 
n&t son Rajiv Oanahi tjook over as th® new Prlisa 
Finister, As soon as h« tooSc 0hai»ge India %dtn©s3©d a 
t3?eodtM3om8 chiaigo as fay as India's oacleaP policy was 
comornga, Ba^iv Gandhi opened the nnclear option for 
India* 
Pakistan m^m ttm militai^ reglae of President 
Zia-i](l Haci 7^9Q^  on updating i t s nsiolearisatlon progr!sam©* 
the nuclear imhitiona of Pakistan are censing gro\dng 
oono^n aooog peae^nl nations m% only in South Aslat 
hut i i se Inhere for obvious reasons for that too, k 
Pakistani natit^aal H,A tmid was arrested ih %h» JMk in 
19^ , He told the eust^aa that the Cargo he iims oarrying 
ym offieial •quiFamt* In fact he ^ma carrying o(»Bponents 
of a ntielear deviee ^ i e h included high speed euitehea used 
in starters* Imerlean attorney Sm Looghoria aaid that 
^ i d ^as a Pakistani agent and the oomponents vere meant 
82 
fbr a ato^ie bnsb* 
IFftltfIlitMli Wfli iiiiiiWH I ••mil _ '± '^  
Polishers CR^ Delhi, ^mM 1985) t PP* 7l*72« 
JQ^ %^i, g|iftpi»."Atjfii Pa^«e imd HealiBPeginl^at Ayiii"in u n 'rh»p^^ 
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A bateh of ^roonitn usod for building of atomic 
roaetors \ms dotaiaed in IHm Itozks Kannady aii*PQ;rt«^  
Caaadlsi Tblloe too had oonflsoated Amariean eHectronie 
aquipmant usad for aorichiog uraniixm wbloh was being 
ahlppad to Pakistan* Si&ilXarly in Britain and Argantlnat 
Pakistani dlploraats ara roportod to have tjfled to parohasa 
83 traatod steel spheres used only in active loses of reactors. 
Scientists and experts In tJ3 foel that the amount of enriched 
uranitio produced in Pg&lstan in tho second half of 1980»s 
thrill be enough to sal^ e six bombs every year and by 1990 
military regSne t^uld be afclo to acoujaaHato about 30 nuclear 
devices, 
RaSlv Gandhi realised such developments as a threat 
to India's security and xd.dened the nuclear option. Prime 
Miniate Hajiv Gandhi categorically and clearly asserted 
that India taould not close Its nuclear options. Though 
Rajiv Gandhi has not opted for the boiBb theory, as a bomb 
after al l Is a bonb and i t wota.d politically iiaprudent in 
the aztrame to bank on the bomb theory. But he has asserted 
that If i t deeaa necessary India would not hesitate to 
oanufaetufe atomic veapona, l^ hls polley of Hajlv Gandhi is 
a depaftim fmm the polloles of all the prefvloos goveraments 
8 ^ m m M S i t a m llBit« iitmteiy» e^w !>aihi» %v«aber 3« 1983. 
:)j 
in Itadia. Hajiv GandQii faXlzm ttmt India's bomb would 
aot as a datarront for India* 
Mdresaing the national d^fenoo oollage on Oetobar 8| 
1985f Ha^ iir OandM, said that India had fifm ovidasK»es that 
the Pakistfttii bomb was foreien finam«d» Ho said that India 
htA doaonstratod to the *4orld that i t had the '.dll f»t to 
ppod«c« mm. after havii^ proved, i ts capability to 
manufacturo tho Umh 11 years ago. He roaffimcsd that India 
was not developing a nwclear devleo but regretted that 
Pakistan tms going ah^d, in tliis regard. He said 
"Pakistan imst desist from making oneh a 
"^ ^^eaiM^ns* If they do i^ e can build detente and 
fo further do«n the road, >ihat l^e seals T?ith i^istan is not detente but entente''* 85 
Mr Gandhi fuller realised that nuclear weapons is a 
dangerous tool in the hands of countries possessing i t , 
therefore, he has repeatedly voiced his concern for the 
U.S. siQ^rt for Pakistan's nuclear plan. In fact IB plan 
to diiiv^r aaasive aid to PaScistan including modem F l6*s 
liaa stained the relation betveen India and Pakistan. 
Prine Minister Hajlv Gan^i said on Hovenber 19S5 that 
India nodld m^ be closing i t s nuslear options in the face 
«r ma&mt veapoae designs of Pakistan,^ since i t vas a 
^ 4 TH; i ITT''Tl ^ n-il ;• r ^  
^Daihi) betcber 9i 198^ * 
iX^U) Kovenber 2, 1985, 
.iG 
tItfMit to India's seouri^ and tttrrltorlal integrity. 
Bajlv Oan^ M procisad the ctetabers of his party in the 
ganaral hody maeting of tha Congress f a7i.l«!ie»t^*7 Par^ 
that 173 had assured hlis that they i^ouid taka up the niiolaar 
87 Issue idth Pakistan, India has wloed its concam to the 
Hainan administration over the US supply of sonhlsticatod 
weapons to Paldgton* \ecopding to official teerlean sources» 
this tJGs understood to havo been convisyed Iqr the Indian 
tehassador, K^* Bajpal during ^ s eeetlng with Bmator 
Klohael Amacost, !*r. Arniacfost tms told of Net? Oelhl's 
coQoern ^particularly at the latest Us supply of arms and 
under air musailos to Pdklstaa, These Dlosiles *Jiich are 
to be delivered on an expedited basis are part of e 50 
million dollar package of 500 sldotf/lndera and othor air 
88 defence equipment. With suoh lethal amaGiont Paltlstan 
eotild disturb the pease of the region. But the US canoot 
put presstare on PWclstani nor ean It , stop the aims aid as 
i t has been blinded by Pfl3eistan*s self proelaieea role, as 
a "frontline state" aga l^nst soviet eacpansionista nartictaarly 
vith regard to Afghaiiialaii. 
Western intelligenee sources believe that China has 
been hoping Pakistan in th» d«fvti.epment of a mbslear bonb. 
Chiiui i s not a n«Rib«r of the loadon based ntiolear suppliers 
gfloup USA* It is niether a party to UPC oer a menber cf the 
g tkr -t Hit ^H^" ^"^^ ^"^^ 
8i« JBJCTTiaytff fW* 
b i 
ZntMfnatlonttl Atonie 0n«pg7 ag«ii<^« Constqusntly i t i s 
the ondy nueltar s ta te ^ l e h I s not twund by any of th© 
eoaireiit$9i3£^ no^tsn that a t pfesant govarn nuelaar oxwr t s . 
Bailing gives top priori ty to Pakistan In framing I t s 
policy moves in South Asia. I t la helalvad that x^hm 
Pakistan had oeasad supply of heavy vmter for i t s Can?)-dian 
reactor after 31, i>eceinhor 1^75* i t rejected ottat^ras demand 
for fu l l scop© safeguards, th i s shortfall \mB oompensated hy 
China iMch fiad bom producing 50 tonnes of heavy vater by 
th© clectrolyslG pnocoKS* Tiscnoi'ts belirives that dhlna has 
been x«ife.lag on gaseous centrifuge teoh!K>losy for cult® 
soEi© t i a o . The ureaoo designs for such technology m s in 
'^ssssslon of Pakistan ^^hlch thoy feel mlcht have bocn 
transferred to China. ^ iihconflrjnod reports indicate that 
Dhina has provided dra^ngs and desifns data pertaining 
to the 20 IdLloton uranluia bomb that I t had tested in 196M-, 
Pakistan ar^lyslsta th^eselves point out that Pakistan i s 
the only pover that emiiii has for pressurising India« Thus 
as the nueloarlsatlon la ooz»erned there is Increasing 
evldeoee on the faet that Pakistan Is steadily coving 
tovards a nualear weapmis oapAblllty, 
Pakistan President Qen* Zla»UL Haq has asserted lils 
eouatry*8 r ight to csake an atoiile boab« Genaral Zla»ui Raq 
w cWprat no. 82, p . ^ . 
^^ 
told an Arabic magazine pid^Ushed fn>m Xondon that ho 
knew Israal had an atosio tsomb and that his eotmtry \mvgA 
change |.|a |)oaltio» <}a2.y i f BPt was ImpXasiented universally, 
Hadlo Kuwait quoted General Zia that Pakistan ^uld refuse 
to bow dovn to the pressure not to ©ake the Xxmh beoatise 
Washiagtoa did not press upon Israel, South Africa and India, 
to a im m^T.^ 
-Thm statement of Sia assumes significance in the 
context of 10 JtiLy*s tJS AHJ not^ iork rotxsrt that Pakistan 
suocersftCLly tested teerican mde Jtryi^ tron nuitches in a 
non-nuolcmr explosion at the nupcsr secret Kahuta wlant off 
Islaaahad, 
llTOUgh there is ao nreois© assessment of the 
technical stage of Pakistan's baab prograeine there are 
number of aut^rativ© accounts tihich indicate that 
Pakistani scientists ore striiring hard to develop f iss i le 
materials despite technical snags, the KNOPP reactor fuel 
rods have be«i 8\;d}3eoted to a low bum up Inorder to reduce 
t&e PB»^0 content in the spent fuel and to enhance PO«>239 
eontent« All this points to the possibility of plutoniun 
92 
whl^ i t night be able to fabricate into a explosive device* 
90* ^jjjftftft Of laflaj|» (^ «»v Delhi), July 16, 198 .^ 
b^ 
Poldstftn has ol>taia«d 6|9K) oentrifuge tvSbm for 
i ts F4khtitft JraalTiD eorlchevat f&«iUty« At Xeast fim 
WSSSIfo^ tomms of aranltUQ has fotmS i ts m^y to PokiatAii 
from Jicor .« Th© elootrloaX a^Qtm^s and other ma^ or 
vaeetiuc iralvoa, gao •^ ca. syntflKs, rotors and ao on Imve 
also hm^n nrDotirofl. It la therefore noardbl© that 
Pakistan DigH m>t ox^'Xieitly doaonatrate i t s ottelear 
oa-abllltiec at loaat tiait tl^^t vhon the ftJll qtieta o^ 
3»2 billion in an^ ii'st^ iQcc* to iV-datoa rtins i t s ^vCLl oonrao* 
Xot i t •'oiiiv* be oafo to assine also that P^^istin %?iii hv 
3or. '^  rcjrt of nwlmir im'tc'^ hy th?* tora oC tht cl©oad©# ^ 
Eot of cIro^ uD'.itanQ©G rirovitJ^ rakiatan to aecolorgtcs i ts 
rtt^l0arlaatifia '^ soc*^ '230« Sho fall of 'h-ih in irm. nml 
ti» 30Vlot iatorvontioa in ,\f0haiii3taJi ©roatod a threat to 
i t s soo«rity# 'Jr> sonsinc this ohang« in th© soot»ity 
aaviromodt i» iioviH^ Asia heean to support Pakistan in i t s 
ptiranits in order to eheok th« ooviets grovinr ii^luenee in 
tht oTMu 3r. Abdel QaAar Khao Polcistan's td- iciciitiat 
has aso^Ptad that P^istan has mantifaetured a hemh tstit hae 
no plana to t«at it»^^ 
Pilcistaii*8 fitioiear thraat vis-a^ia India ia of groat 
aigniflQaneo. %jiv Onndhl opan^d ^ o mieloar options for 
Xaaia* India's daeiaion t^at tho biilk of har powor 
ranntrosaata ahoiAd ba found fvon tha nuelaar memy is 
(MM), farah ,^ 198I 
. TH* i ?rm75 •'-Tf,i. 
b i 
b«fl«d on i i^ taper abmdaiiQ* of a 1c«gr atonic fu«3. thorium, 
India has ^ e «orld*s larg«st reserves of thoriian estimated 
to be tivar 5»OOftKJ0 toones in a readily extraotaKLe form. 
But thorins is not a fissible material and eaziaot be 
directly used to produce po'wer. It has to be coaverted 
into fissibl© material, India also lias significant 
reserves of uraniuca • 233 ^as energy potential of about 
SfOOfOOO tonnes of good quality eooX* "Hius India could 
make atonic ireapons t^ea i t deaas necessary. 
But nuclear weapons syster' are incomtilete t/ithout 
a delivery tMch % ©^thcr cdssile or aircraft, and coramand 
and ©sutrol ©tiuiixient, consisting largely of dleotroiiic 
coromunication and radar systems. The aioetronies division 
of Bhabba /itoraio Hasearch Centre had developed into an 
autonomous Electronics corporation of India and produces 
control systems for reactors* fhe eorporation is nov 
produsliit oomptxters other companies dealing vitib electric 
equiptent are nov making head vay and will be oapable of 
meeting r«dar and eommtsiieation requirements in due course, 
India hae developed a nide range of nuclear 
engiaeeriag capabilities Particularly in the fields sueh 
as fti^^pnoeeeaing. At present India is developing a 
••riM «f fiocicefte. the Roeket piopcdLlant plant and Rocket 
b j 
fabrl0«tSoii fsicllity at the Vlkram Sarabhai Spaee C«atp0 
at TrlvaOidPUD are oapabla of making larga sized ifockets, 
Tha launch station at Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh is 
•quij^ad xfith to test long range space boosters. The solid 
propellant spaoe booster plant at sriharikota ean mantifactnre 
large sizad propellants for fuelling spaoe vehicles. It can 
make propellent blocks up to ttio metres in diaaeter and 
weighing upto 10 tons oae^ X three stage rocket capable 
of launching a sat^l i te of about 800 Kgs in synchronous 
orbit and is being planned. I'eanw!iile military eacrjerts 
bdllcve that th© sukoi* fifth tor bonborg already in service 
%jlth ^ e Indian Air Force could be adorited for delivering 
loii^»yeild nuoloar missiles. 
Thus Indiai vis-^^vis Pakistan now has a very good 
delivery system. In case of a Pakistani threat India could 
gather sai i t s resource and detery Pakistan in i t s atteapts. 
Pa is tan like Isra^t s^ following a policy of 
keeping th* boeb in a basement and d«olarin)g i t as a nuclear 
pover. to meet their challenge» India has to take steps t 
not only to def«iid i ts security and territoirial integrity 
but to pFosoPve poaee in South Asia. 
9% Potir l4roii| ifm indlan lo»i Nuoloar Tosti ^or PeaeeTHl 
Poi^eit? ia lUP* Mlara (edt«) tauA fhammn Press (Ptft>lleation Divisionj 
ho 
"EffgAHLlSHMgJT (F HICLEIR IIISTALLATIOHS IH IHDIA AM? 
•^^mm-
i^ atftbl Ifllmaflt of Ntifllear InatftllittlQna ia India 
India's nuelear ppogracae and polioy represent 
one of tho nations frontlln® ventures j at cutting edge of 
sciontlflc and technolog-loal progress moderated of course 
by the constrants in a developing country, 
fhe men largely responsible for the development of 
India*o nuclear prograisBio during i t s early years were 
PaMit Jawaharlal Jlohru and Dr. Honi BhaWia, 
fhey visualised the crucial role to be played by the 
nuclmr energy in future to bring India out of hunger and 
poverty. Pandit tehru considered nuclear power vital for 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of an industrially and 
ooonoBii<»lly weak nation like ours* 
iiMle Msphasising the role of nuclear enargy in the 
oountrys d^velopeieat and progress and suggesting i t s uses 
only for peaoafUl purposesi he said in the eonstltutient 
Asseiribly on April k^ I9»i8 i 
••• atonic energy is a vast souroe of pover 
tiiftt is eoBing to the tiorld «•• if we are to 
b / 
F«Biftln a!>i*«ftst i n the Korld as a nation 
^Meh keeps ahead of things, ve oast devslop 
t h i s atoBiie ^xergy, qidts^^part fwm twos* 
li»leed* I think ve Binst develop i t for the 
purpose of using i t for peaceful purposes**,?? 
Dr. Homi BhatJha a groat sc ien t i s t , having foresight 
and deep conviction believed that the atom can b© used to 
t rans la te the vision of Hehru into r ea l i t y . 
In 19M»> Dr» Bhal*ia had written to the Dorab^i TATA 
Trust Pointing Out the nood to create proper coMition and 
financial stjpport to f a c i l i t a t e tho dovdopifflit of Science 
in India* Ho said s 
"When nnelear energy has been sueoassfully 
applied for power prodtution say a couple 
of decades from now, India will not have to 
look abroad, for i t s experts but wil l find 
thect ready at hand"* 96 
The response was positive* The TATA Ins t i tu te of 
Fundanental Research (TXFR) came into existence in June 
19^5t v i th the aim of carrying on Fundaisental research in 
PhysioSi Mathanetics, and Allied Sciences. The woUc 
related to atonic «)ergy was then aoved to Tronbay 
Or* Shabha sow th is ins t i tu t e as the cradle of our atomic 
energy d«valos»«it for peaceful purposes. 
^ 9p« 3P>33PK oovifniiai or India (Itow OeiM. 19*w)* 96. f i » p i ^ f af *ai.»i^ «.w*yi>t> to r^A^ (195N«M 
itiit «f AtMiie sairgyi Oovt* of lodiai p» h. 
bo 
Mhvk nuel^tf wMPgy was thought of oaljr In tefms 
of distruction, Bhabha bad the courage to strike a 
^if^ifoftt^iiotG* a# r^ttliaad t^i^ o^f^-s^i^iafioe had to %e 
the logical outcome oT India's ^dear Policy especially 
vhm. know hov was hlddcsi In Warheads, He also realised 
tftiat a policy of sdf reliance tifould aueoeed only if there 
were enough mm. and ^onea callable of meeting the challeiige. 
His effort "mB to brln ;^ out the hidden talents. The 
restat »^s a aev^opmeot tmDaralled In the history of 
science and teehaologyt 
Tiwoe •* Tier Ftover Progromno t 
Bhnbha hod proposed following three steles In tho 
couatrys atomic mergy dcvelop^eat for peaceful rjurposes, 
t« Building of heavy tmter moderated reactors \4ilch 
could produce power as veil as plutonltac needed to 
start the breeders. 
2. UtlXialng the plutoalUD produced from first stage 
reaotors la Itie fast breeders. This stage will continue 
tntil suitable thoriutt-uranitm « 233 reactors beoome 
availableI and 
3. To rt» stage XI type breeders on a thoriun feed to 
pfodiMe uraniUB • 33 and run ^ e second type of breeders 
b J 
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on th© thoriw uranitBa • 233 cycle* ^ ' 
aetl£»ir^iaiM»e he^ hewt bas4o i]4*liK;i^« of IxsSln*^ 
nmsl&uf prograane. The eountpy entered the field of 
nudear research oomparfttlvely at later stage than the 
advanced com t r ies . However thanks to the untiring 
eTforts of i)r, Bhahha and Pandit Heliru, i t r^as possible to 
create a nool of scientific manpower, Hatching the best, 
onytrhero in the «orld«^" 
Thus, India's nuclear progratsmo «^ifl the reaiSLt of 
Panait Jdira*o tsiorld vision and hie passion for peace. Tim 
prograraa© \m.B foroalLated to meet the fundasaeatal problems, 
confronting, the netdy bom nati<xis. 
After tSic establishment of f ASA Institute of 
Ftmdamental Hes^ Mprch an embryo of India's atomic programme 
aany steps were initiated to organise mens and materials 
for aehieving i t s objectives. The Atoeiic energy oomr-isslon 
uas fomed on 10 Atigtiat 19^ under the Atomic energy Act 
1 9 ^ . ^ « ^labha vas appointed I t s f i rs t Chairman.^ 
Nelira alviys vanted to use nuclear energy for 
peoe^ua. ptflppoeea* 
97* I ^ MBHa SesretariAte t%tlonal Stielear energy Progranne Qov«n»iai 9t ladiA iumi !>alLhl, I9d5)| P* H^ 
9o* 0«0^ iil>«h»na>ni aB& P«K«$» RMtboodirit 
gr«BB«, 
iNELhi, p s r s p i r 
u 
stressing tfa« laporatlve ne«d for utilizing nuelesr 
snorgy for posooful purposos Pandit li^iru pointed out in 
The use of atomic energy for peaoefuX purposes 
i s far 9ore important for a country, like India 
that i s to say in a country i ^ s e power resources 
are limited than fbr a ootntry like Fr^oe, an 
industrially advanced country* It is important 
for a pow@r starved or power hungry country like 
India or Biost of othor countries in Asia and 
Africa, 100 
Initially the institutional frans'ionc and scientific 
and technological infrastructure for oxtensiv© research and 
dev©10T«icnt nocessaSfy to rears benefits of neif source of 
mergy were non-cjxistent in India. Tho government %ms very 
vf^l a^ j^are of the potential contribution that titioloar energy 
eotad make, a great contributions towards the co\Hitrys» 
eecmc^ Qio progress after independence. Its urgency was 
explained by Pandit Sehru in the following t^ ords s 
"Xf wa do not set about i t now, taking 
adivaatafa of the proeess i s that go towards 
til* aaklag of atonic eneii:y and join in the 
HaiiAa of Mhalara and researchers ^lo ara 
trying to develop i t , we will be l«ft behind 
• •• state tho^d give every facility for this 
developBeiit**, 101 
100* kdUUOilUkplbteliii ^^ 195^1 ^oi. i«o (c 7036) 
101. '!r*^lf*T^-^f1i1fMl ^**ll'' (legislative) Vo: 
m* 1, April 6, 19W» p, 3315* (»aw Oelbl). 
7 i 
Th& Atonic energy act 19^ entrasted the job of 
harnosalog fttosdlo eaefgy to ^ e ^mtftl gmsemmt \nxim 
wail given the responsibility to control the development oft 
(a) any industry conneotcjd with tile promotion or use of 
atonic energy and; 
Cb) any nineral which is or may be used for the production 
or use of atomic energy or research into aatters eoanected 
thereia*^^^ 
The Atonic Hnorgy bill yaa laovod in eontwitunnt 
Assaably vith a view to provide for the dev^opaent and 
control of atosic energy and for purposes connected with 
i t . The Act entrusted the oontrol of atomic energy 
e3B»lusiv«ily to the central governaent and provided a 
legislative framework for the initiation of India* 9 nuclear 
pxograBBae» It provided a legislative sanction indespensable 
In a parliffaentary democracy. The Act therefore was an 
ii^rtaiit legiiOative measure in the evolution of the nuclei 
poliegr of India* It served i ts purpose for foortesn years 
after vhieh i t was replaced by the Atomic energy Act of 
1962.'»' 
i62m F«C« d*fkar (edt.) ^ 
Cideutta 1952. p« 67* 
i^rjiWi^.T4vf,»ii»frfJH.w.i.'.w?v?; 
103. K.K» Fn^ik, |n8ipf.,Pglte3Lflr IndUt XlUrt >ftirta 
HUEiaiBMXit ITew Delhi, 1990, p« 3* 
'U 
Thii Atamiffi Sniggy l e t 1962« 
This vas a eonprehtusiVA XaglsXati^e t&e<is\a« d^llDg 
with the naelear prograime of India* It %ias passed \fs the 
PcuJllaacmt In 1962 la viow of tha a©velopnents in the f i^d 
after tho onactneot erf 19^ Act, It empowered the central 
government s 
(1) to produce, develop, use oxid dispose of atomic cmergy 
aixd oaJrry out research into any natter oonxieoted therewith; 
(ii}not tdthstanding anythine contained in the elcotrloity 
(supply) Act 19^ *8, the central governoent shall have 
autliority. 
(a) to dev^ OT) a souad and aidec|uate nationaa policy In 
regard to atoroic power to co-ordinate such policy with 
the ccaitral electricity Authority and the state 
electricity boards constituted under sections 3 and 5 
respect ive of the Act and other similar statutory 
corporations concerned with the control and utilisation 
of other power resources; 
(b) to imploaeat sohemes' for the g^ieration of the elect-
ricil^ in pursuance of sush poliey and to operate atomic 
power stations in the namier determined by i t in 
oonsultaticm with the Boards or Corporations concerned 
with wliom i t rtiall enter into asresDeats regarding the 
•iipply of fiLeetricity so pffodaoedi 
IS 
Cc) to fix rates for and regiilate the s i^ ly of eXeetrioity 
from atomic pover statlooa^ td-th the ^os&WT&ao^ of tfie 
central eleetriclty authority; and 
(d) to &at0e into arrangemmts ^ t h the eleotrLoity Board 
of the state in \^oh an atoiaic pover station is 
situated for the transmission of eXeotrioity to aajy 
other state* 
^ fh© Act of 1962 xiaa a very signifleant step in the 
evolution of India's nuclear policy because i t clarified, 
the objectives of this policy in unmlstaJjable terms* Xt 
provided for Utio development control and use of the Atomic 
energy for the w^fare of the people of India and other 
peaoefta purposes and for matters connected therein* ^  
Heiffu and Bhabha persuaded the Trustees of Sir 
Dorabji TAIA Trust to finance the establishment of the TATA 
Institute of Fimdamental Research in 19Mf vhere much of the 
eointfys iaitiail voxk on nudear teehnology took place. 
Few years later on August 10, 19^ the Atomic 
snergy eoemlstion iws formed with the active support and 
eneouragfnent from Nehru* 
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tho Atomie Energy Act 19U8 paid th« m^y for the 
erefttion of an Instltutionflkl frammioAi to pursiM th» imelear 
progPanme with vigour. 
Atonic Energy Cosiinljsioa vas eonstittitod (m 10 August 
19^, to launch a ftai fledged etoiale energy rirogjtmmp.. But 
in 1958, as a result of past ©xperimce and developments the 
governsQHt of India aft^r careful consideration decided to 
r€30onstltute the ABC investing i t vfith full extensive and 
financial powers, and replacing the coiamission of 19^* 
The ecmmiission was entrusted with the follo^ng 
fuojtionst 
(a) To foraulate the policy of the department of the Atosic 
energy for the coaaideration and approved tiy the 
Prime Minister, 
(h) to pMpare th« budget of the departnent of Atomio 
energy for eftch financial year ag»A get i t approved hy 
the gov«ff»#iitt mA 
(0} to InploMnt the policy of the goveranent in all 
mattttps ooneeming atoalc energy,^^^ 
105« Department of Atonic Energy (DAE) Oovt. of India Annual 
Report 1957-58 (ll«if Delhi 1958), p, 25. 
7D 
tee maenda guney Mt * 
It v&s set up by 11)6 Atomio Saorgjr CooalasloD in 
19^* The unit later graduated into the present Atomie 
minerals division under the Department of Atoaio £k2ergy« 
Its efforts restated in loeating uraniua and thoriixi 
depo^t^ in Blh«JO« This org«,is.U<m ooatlm^ to 
m^v&^ prospects of dovedoping tiranitxa, thorim 
niobiu!»- tantalem and others atomio siinerals in selected 
107 
areas of tlio country• ' 
3?h0 Ii^an rare earths liaiited^ > is a governcteat 
of India indertaking i^hich has be«i functioning since 1950, 
It has hem functioning since 1950. It operates the 
minerals sands industry in Manualak uriehi and Chanare and 
rare earths industry at Alvayi* The undertaking is also 
operating a l^orium extraction plant at Pronbay* 
As a 9%mlt of the aetlirities of the iiPC, and 
availability of seieatiflo and teehnioal personnel the 
feasibility of eiabavking «^n a ftAl fledged atomie energy 
progranne was f d t by 195^ * On Aoguat 3, 195^ a separate 
departeient vas th«reifiBre set up and ohargaa solely with ttie 
m* mSSmBTSrAibmi» hammt^^Hmmm or hSim 
^ imii^ f"ir^i i9n*fh ^•^ ^iua, p« 112. 
1 9 0 * JSBSUm $ P*^ ^ 
ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENTS IN INDIA 7/ 
Nuclear Research Laboratory 
High Altitude Research Laboratory 
Heavy Water PIdnt 
Atomic Power Station 
Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics 
Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre 
Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. 




Centre For Advanced Technology 
OSCOM Project 
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre 
Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant 
Tata Memorial Centre 
Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. 
Nuclear Fuel Complex 
Atomic Minerals Division 
Seismic Station 
Reactor Research Centre 
Rare Earths Plant 
Mineral Sands 
E'>v€.»\.gv p*v.»l»xa.:r»*T*vfe 6.oV«.^-i^'>»va.rut d|3 ^.ffli*/^ 
/6 
to »«t t^ a sepsrat* iottitatioa ea3.X«& %im 4%osie Ekiargy 
Efltablisteint of ttomhsy ii«a3r Bee^ i^ r for rosoaxoii «nA 
d«vetloiia«afe of the peaoofta usos of atoele «i«xf3r« Tho 
•stabllfllawit lias foraaXXy inangwated Isgr tht than 
JRrifflo MiaistoF Fandlt ^amhaflal H^ ibfii on Jaaaafjf 20, 1957t 
and lattf in 1967f i t was rm&mwSL **Bliatiia Atonie Raioareh 
Cantro",^ ®^ 
BABQ ttoa pVMi^ ar inatitutlim in nualaav voiearoh 
and dofiAopaaBi haa «• i t s oradit, savaral aeldofaaantfl tliat 
hmm aada tiNa avvrtiy ataif««aiiaBty in tiia f iaaid of aMlaar 
povMTv iMNMWli «nd dof idopiant at Bine ovar tuo jraara haa 
poaifttad la aa|o# oonttHlnillotts to b^o wi^aar powar 
pPigMHio and Mooasioa ia tho aatiyo ftiaS. oraBlo fioai 
asi^lAtatloii of uraniw t t topiotoasioK i^ant fiial and 
MigrtiLtei of tiio pliitoBiiai Dotaatopaaat of eaaiplaai oontmX 
tMMm tjiwiatloB and MdalMMMMKi MMI faaOL faliftmittiMi 
B wiotiir Mvffiwio a* # t pm f^ '' | tM*M 
7 J 
• f list ar« MK« ^ thv »tii£tl«tK«a «aee«ssfv(Ujr n4ft lar 
D«vfl9Lopm«nt of mlx«d 0ttf1»id« fu«il at Tsombay for 
r ' 
Sftttt Bretdor Tost Ho«8tev (PBfR) is tho first stop in tbo 
seeoad i^ haso of tlio iracloar pzogriMRO Iwsod o& ttMi 
utiliiatioxi of tho ttiorina rosotoroos* 
Signifioont spin off s using atom for pesoofnX 
purposes in tho fiolds of i^eoo defotieot industrsr, 
agrietHturo and nodlioine mve also ^orgod from tho 
110 
rosoaroh and dovolopnant at fronliay* 
k largo rosoaroh plant mmwrk (100 HiO has boon 
111 built ood attainod first eritioalitgr on Aogust 8, 198 .^ 
OfflttTVA first nottt oritioal on August 8, last joor 
and vas dodioatod to tho nation W tho Priao Miaistor on 
lovoBWr 111 1985* 8iit i t has rosaiaod aonMoporatteftia. 
ofw siBBO hooMoo of osMossivo vibration of tho fuol 
ass«iHios iihSeh BOAO UM roootor unsaf o at mxf powor* 
Tho rottotor nas dooigMd to produeo wuciataB thovMdL powor 
of 100 Mr b ^ i t aovor got bsgrond 25 MV. Tho 100 mr 
roasts i s natioma «ViftiMiod aolol f uol tad hoaiy watsr 
taifii i9iiN l^titf mm iw)| ii 3©i*^  
b 
i s tts«ft tetfa M9 ooolftBl tod «• m Boaaratat* 
pet^ned d«fiiiit«i7« tli* sQicntlftts norktag on iai« 
iPMuitor ^r« taken aba<)k iditn th«9« was a najop raonrranea 
of Hia vibration pvobXm iMeh has baan plagtiaiag tUm 
raaetor <s(Vdr since i t s eritioalitgr aohisvsd in Jlngiast 198 .^ 
Bs, 9% taSXlixm IShfuva m^s to be oparationaX in eaxOy 
Di»« P,K« Iyengar, i^ireetor of the BAUD has said that 
tSie ]n«blen oootirrad again and in f aot soae rods are 
beaieved to have eoXlapsed, Dhmra's in&efinita shtxt dovn 
has serionsly obstmoted the davcloinwit of fast breeder 
reaetor prograne* Bnt the aeientists are doing their best 
119* 
to bilng i t in i t s oparationaX stage. 
^I^ addition to taie varions Xaboratories for oavrying 
ont rasaarah in Migrsiast Chaoistry and BloXogjr, AgriaiAtuvay 
Madiidaa, r^ aad faatwaXoiy, HuaXaar Bngiiiaaffiag, Xaotti^ 
taalnaldgy NtdaiXurgjr •!«• bia* the eantia «lso has nnniiK 
MataX PXiAt nraniiSB TwH Ait»ieatioii Plant fwA Bapvaaassiag 
PXant «akd tUxad Qiide FliaX Fabrlaation Plant* Bitiie has sat 
np n BirarxXiw plan* the third eaantiy in IAM voi^d to do so 
mA a radio phaiaaacotiania Xsiteratoiy, XsoplMni at Viashi, 
F«A m»0»emuim f^tm immm) moA m VnolAtv watt* 
if^terifiwtioii PiaB% at Xtrftpur art 9lm pftrlt of BABC. 1 ^ 
f«riiM« SoATgr ii3r«!l»t«ni « « a ^ ^ ^ Cai^tttta i«^« aft^ Umttl 
fMilit^r fo» ftAvvaietd noxk la HIMIMT n^tiAt, SH^MT 
ClMMistePjri ftPoAufttloii of Z9otop«s for viortiiiat appliofttioiit 
mA MdlatSoii damatt studias on VMetMir nateriale, 7h» 
SeisBle staUoa at GftWibidanur l^ear Bang«loy» sat tip ia 
tli6 a^Mtloa and IdaatlfieatioA of wAwgwvM mtslaar 
axpXoalozis. Tkm WmlmtJif Raaaaireh tm\mvAtory at SrlmKar 
and Hi|^ Attitude Hesaaifc^ liabajfatovy at GiOiaane conduot 
raseareli la atnosphara Pfeiyides and Cosodc ray Fhysiea, 
thus BABCS aetlYltlat oovar a ^da ranga of araaa wmh 
as Pharslosy Chaslat^^ Snglaa^lag metallurgy futiL 
r^rooasalng, fual faibrieatlon radio Isotopaa vaata 
maaaganoot alaa^rmilcis food taelsiologjr radiatlcm nadioina 
ala* flia oai^a haa davCopad a aiabar c^  taateioioilaa 
•wa of uliiaii hava alraadjr baca transfarrad to iadttttvy for 
aaaaartial lotploitatioa. 
At JUSLpfSkm^ XaMll Hadu^  tlia Baaotar Raaaarah Cantra 
wdartAaa raaaarah mA daffal«pi«at pattalaiac ta faat 
toraadar raaa^tv %m»tMmBf» ^^« aaatra at Kalpaiew la 
8:. 
This &s an lBp»iPt«at f Milllyr bdag or«at«d la tlt« 
mvmtwf ^MMh i s «a^ p«et«d.jQ^ a^L«ar A^  sitnifieaiit xol« i a tli« 
dsviXoiBflat of Jfssetftf t«titeieSll08gF« Ih« aanfer* is sa^sotsd 
tNi pTQVias ssepsifiiiios in ths dssiga oonstniotisa «»& 
epsmtioii of pltHenim fllXed sodiiis eooXed fast r^iolor* 
Xa sMition ^e Ceatvo ^XI ti^p in tho oomtjrastion sad 
opeipfttioa of pl^ KtoaiuiBi ftHlei sodlora cooled fast :ifoaetojr« 
It will also sorv€ m m t^r&Amti&B facility ^hieh is 
•ssonti&l for denreloping fuol tov th« Isrgo fast bvosdov 
resotor ot th© futisre. la addition the oeatre ^rill hiAp 
In th«» oonstaraetion sad op«P9stioa of ihe fast Breeder tost 
HsaetorQ and ttso of the tost roaetor for studios in 
Qonaoetion with ftfturo fsst breodors. 
It nas btiilt br Zadisn ou^o«r noikors thsssslvos 
Mild it iSTBlioillstd tiMilr o«Bf idMMo and dot«Niiaatioa» It 
is so booanso Ifisi^i s^ dLlar toastors mtro availabda ab»oad 
tlisgr dosidad to bi^d i t ott tiioir om rofloetiag Bbabiia*s 
iasist^ioa m ssdf soffieiowy and ssatf^vcdianso. It is 
a ooa ttOgKwatt PMl tgrpo roaetory tlio first in Asia ontsido 
mm iraflU^^ ^ %8aia hmmm aritioal oa h dmast f9$i»^^ 
!«; sat Jirtg'a,'ij»y4g^ a& fcL 
So 
mmm ttif ^ii* ^' ^ i^ fmnt jraalcliit aatioas in f^% 
fiiOLd mm* ttm wmmUw mm «avl«litA wmaim PaA* 
But now this rmQ%&r will ^« d^oewslsfloxtod* 
Ziidim*8 grand eld vesMoreh iPMOtor Aptarft ^i* tfminttts 
gfomd for tht domtryl* top atwl««ar s«i<iitittg iriU l»e 
tlie first a^ i^ MT realtor to t>« dotODidasloiiod aooording 
to Dr. ?•£• ZsraogaTt Diroetor of BABC. 
iThis iioiQ.d oQtail dim&txtliiig the roaetor and 
saf ea^  storiog tlie radioactive parts that renaia daagoroiiui 
for years uaooataviaated parts like ooatroX oqtiiiaent and 
ptSBps QotHA 1»e defixsed* 
**nie realtor baiit in 1956 s«pv«d vtU aad nas due 
to rotiro ho said l»mt did not ^eolfy when deoonaissloniiig 
i«o^d begin* He said^ 
'*8ttt the all hvnaa bolats roaetors too met dio"» 
Aptara*8 ago liad started sloviag its thsiaod 
mdwrn had started to loolc mA i ts dww tank 
had oorrodod, 115 
l^ttia was follovsd mr oims a No •etiwatt reaetor 
etettsd with the 0aaaiAiaa help* the Oaoadiaa assistante for 
M l i H g th» wmamw mis »eii^«A iiade» Hw oolwiho j^m and 
(istMiii), »JMwH»ii» *Hf»»*l|i • / f * ^ mrntmnf- •*p*wM-mM » 
8^ 
i t th« first vm^ow pfojtet la the fl«(Ld of Iit««raatioiiia 
Qo^ptamiOxm $ i l ^ al%aia«d first eritieftlity on to JvOy 
Oinis is iatsodid for rossoveh la nueisftr aad 
voootor Hiysiesf «:^ (iaooring oxporlaoats for tosting aow 
roAotor siatsrials and systsn dovs^ lopntfit of fa<a and 
Sfttorials for uso in future roaotors* Ffodoation of 
various kinds of radio isotopos in largo quaatitios tov 
the use in agrietatitfo biology, industry and aedioino. 
Production of plutonim and uranium and training of 
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personnal in roaetor operation and roaotor toeinology, 
Zorlina * Zoro Baergy Heaotor for later Investigations and 
Son AssoaKLies t 
Zeeiina is Indias* third rate ton It was d«iignad 
engiaeerod and huilt «itir01y by Indian persoonti.. It 
raaobed witleality oa 1^ January 1961, ihis is a soro 
eoMfy roMtMT and diffars fioa i^sava and oir«s in that 
i t i t vary low pomm raaotor, ^le Baxiaoi doi^ gaod power 
levil holiMt OBly 100 imttt* Xt*s eore oaa ht variod at 
win. It i t thus a flexibili^ faeility nhioh hat proved 
a vi^iirias iaQ>«flMatal Uol tw the exaniaatioa of «io 
pMpiVtiat of variout typot of anoloar faelt and geoHiotriet 
mm 
»% aM»,'»r* "*''" "• 
^Umi0iMm, M. tf iia. 
HJ 
lAd t99 etfrylng oufe a m»A% vajfl«ty of «>ep«rsa«a6s cm lh# 
imtcr re(|«lJFed for tho rogetor v«c obtalnod oa loan fi^o 
tiM iMitod States I Atosdo Snossy Coossissloiu ^ 
natoalma Besietoi* for HatitJroalo InTtstlgatlon in 
natlpX^rixtg Assffiblles Ptamliaa i s a sero eosergy temei»» at 
1!»mba3r* Xt bottama erltieal (m 22 Hajr t972« The raaetoF 
tm® dasigaedy fabsloated aodi oomiaisaioiiod ontireiy tsy 
se i^t l s t s aM aEig^eava of B^O, 
!eii« AtoMl;^  l^arala DUriBlon haa Ita hMdquartera 
at E^avabad idth f iva raclonal ha«A<|tiairt«P8 in othar pavtt 
of tlia eemtif • Zt ia saialjr aatrtsstadt nith raaaafoti 
daf«3.oi»Mit aetiirltlas partalaiiiK to ittAimmtrU and 
gaoloi^aai aorvflgrs anploratioii proapaetiag and daf^lopnaiit 
of vart^na ttlaaial raaouraaa naadad for tha mt^aar povar 
I2f« SFlt i i i la Saarotariati a* 9?, p* t4. 
8u 
rein (BBtl* 
loeat^d at I|yd«ral»a«, HH3 p»»duo«t fu*l for th« 
ntielear power jfdaetors of th# eountry* the o^i^ex 
ooQslats of TWOfleus Hants fO* the confession of yollov 
oifeo Into eroffdlo gr«A« aatuPal «J«» im eaJPiohtdl tiraaioi 
heaafltjpldo lato «Kiriohod urftaltttt oxide* Zireon saad to 
slTftofloy ooapoii^ Jta AHI aranluR dloxiao to sintorodl 
peailots and finally to fu«flL Assfliablios* produetion of 
otaapoaents ismh m blaaket fttdl eoatalaiug thoria pellets 
nickm, eaa steca reflootor asa«mies ©to. jpe<iiiir«l fof 
BB^ fOBss ports o? the ftt^ falji^ioatioa progfauaao* A 
plant for maatifaotiuyiag very high tjurlte matezl«d.s 
yeqolred for the eleotfoalo Inawst]^ is also located at 
tlie Heavy o^atev Han «t Nangal Ptnjab is based on 
tlie eleetfiolyals of mate? and lov trnperature feydfog«i 
distUlatioii, It has aa aaaual eapaelty of 1^ toaaes 
hmvf vater. Shis plaat im* eomlssioaed la Augast 1962. 
Beavy vrat«r plant at Baroda la based oa the 
•»aothe«aia ameaia • hydtogoa sanhaage pjroeess* She 
patent is linked to tbe syntlitsie ges ettesm of the 
mmmmimtm^i^yg • WHI m ma I 
f «Ci mmUm 
8/ 
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Hwiqr j^«t«r planl Xotft Is bft8«& on kmi^ iDv daviTopier 
lyr BABC on s^rdfogoa - sulphide tuit«r «acoliftQs« pxoe«tf* It 
i s Ijoofttod Q«xt to BAPS at limat Qim%%% Hajast!iail« 
^^ s^'l^  water plant Tutioorin i s linked to tJi# 
ferttttzee t)lant of the Soti^ liem Petvo ChenicaX Indus tries 
Corporation* ftiis plant i s similar to ttie Bafoda Plant* 
Heavy water i^aat f aloher t^oh is baaea on 
hitSieraai ananoaia hydrogen m-.t^hrnQo prooesa trill tiso the 
synthesis gas straaa of ittuxmia rdant of Fertiliser 
Corporation of India* 
Heaty wftter plant ISua Vaishet Maha»ishtra i s tiased 
on B»no ^eesal aaaionia ^ hydrogan exehange pv09mB* the 
plant at Shal ^alshat will he having mmaH prodtietion 
eapftoitsr of 110 tonnes* 
Heaiy water laant sMMmgitm i s hased on the hithensal 
hydrogen st4phide • mater eaBshange pfoeess* Hie i0Lant v i l l 
hate amraal prod»etion oapaeity of 135 tonnes* 
the l^ aoilear Povm Board is respmsihie for the 
8a 
4«&ipi^ «9iiiM(CiHLlieo eowilffioiiSiiC waA op«v«tloa of aii6l«ar 
pouMF ^wilf. It It pjpwttttly opwrnttm »t«a9 i » i » 
^atttnxitlng tbe Nueor* Kii£vapftr» KftS«ft t»& Kot«lc (tHits 3* )^ 
•tcHBie povtr pxojeots, 
Hmaraft lEllfflaetr i^ mr^ of iBtm^m^f 7APS i s tba first 
ftttmio poviJP statloa In lMla« It hm t«o l»Q::iJ.liig ^at«p 
^pe roAotors «a0£i,of 210 HUC gsoss eapaeity, fti«31«d tiy 
«iviohed ttranl3»* Tb* stittioti stii^Ilea «a«etrlol^ to 
MeOiafftshtPa aol GuJaTftt* 
X4»«otoA at HtMwtMmtta BAJasthaHi the ttUtloii has 
tio notwaPi wmtvm fuillod pvotstsrlsoA hMyy sater jfaaetors 
••oil of 220 KIB gross oopooltsr* tm further units of 235 
126 MIC mm will also bo sot xtp at RAPS* 
Looatod at KalpakMB ObouA i kllonotors soiilli of 
Nadiiraa Mi^ lias tuo aatuml taPsnloB faslX^A prossitrisoa 





OiHi unit has hmm pxodneiiig i3.«Gt]p&eit3r on oom«volaX 
b i i i t sine* JMiMUQr S7i 198^ Iti* otiMr unit •ft%ftiii«& 
fijrat evitioailitar on Ingutt 12t 1985* HAP8 is tiMi f irst 
3&e pjtQ^mfi is md«r oonstmotioii at Hasora tlttaOf 
I>ri^ ea3i« I t ooaslsts of tm prassorlsed haai^ r nater raaetoF 
tmits ©a(^  of 231^  HiiD gross oapaoltsr* 
Loeatad t t Kalorapar Otijarat ^ a tioi^ k oa ttm pto$m% 
has oo»Giisdd« fha projaot v i U bava tuo prassurisad haatar 
Batar raaators aaoh of 23^ Huct gross eapaoitar* 
ITilgi illilifl ilJBrtWMf JRfftllflLl. * 
XiaaataA iifc Saiga in Kamataka tha station v i U 
hava t ^ mita of 235 wm aaaH.^^ 
IR2 ia a govaraMat aoBpasr foaetioaiiig aims a 195i0* 
tha aoBptfV liaa tuo siaaffaX aanfta saparatlwi plants at 
MmamOLilnMobi and Cligvara aal a Bara Barths Plant at 
J&.'m^^ wm ia aiao sattiag 19 a Sa, 110 ^t^w% iM»a|a«t at 
m aa,» ^ ^ 
.'U 
for pteduetloii of ^mfiom MMw^r^eaBt'9tSL9»^^AAiiA 
pm^nets^ fli# eonpaeor is also managine fherfumPlant at 
tiNsmbay* 
m^ KCIL MS siit xxp at ^dembad la 1967 to 
mantjfactta*© ^eetremio asystiBs iastifiisciits and eowjjemfflita 
tjasad i?rl!narja.jf on Sn&igmmvm teohnolog r^* 
tnteiiil±ttie& in Ootofeai? 1967 ^"^ i s »©^»nsibl© foa? 
tha a i^v^opmmt of tha tiranite mina and opaafatSon of tha 
indigiooualy dai^ned 1000 tomies par day traaitua mill at 
Jadufeiaia, tkm aooparatlon tias set ttp wmslvm Faaairavy 
ip&aat haa alao baaii aat t^ by VCIL to raoovar •oeaaaavy 
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•Inirala soeh m aoopari magnatte and aobg^dotias* "^  
IQiaia lUPa alia atli«p aidad inatltttiiaaa attab aa t^a 
7ASA Zaatituta of Fmiapaiitai Raaaarali f otmlad i s 19^ as 
a aantva far pwv^l^t AmAmmtOi vaaaarah la MatbiBatiaai 
thaaMtiaal pbyaiaat aaMie vaya and isitiLaaiyplsQri^ ai^ aiid 
a^ ilMV fiELatai diaalia.laaa. 
7W 
! i i 
1!h« tiXk ninoflaX oiatir« XoeatoA at Bombaar i s tht 
fSowmont 9«atr« 1»oth In p*ti«ait oar« audi la 0iiM«r VMi«Ay<^  
Sh« S«lia XimUtttta of Siiail««r Ittjrflaf nat f&xmaiy op«itd itt 
^fmamxy 1950* th* Xntt^tula pioOaoM fsolXltlas in •ii^ne«& 
rMMreli In tha fields of «q;>«vii&onteal and thtter«ti<i«l 
nuoloiur Fl^sieSf nnoloar Chimistrjr «rid oth«r& rested 
disoipl ino8« 
m. 1S%0 inntltvSiixmn arcf mgaged in prodisetion of 
naeleav m^g? meant for poacefta tises in tli© fi^da of 
Medioi^, agi>ioxtLttiro and genatation of «Ie«trieity eto« 
Tb0 4tO!&io an<^ gy psogsamao of liadiat aftar making 
tvaaentoiia affopts duadUig Hie Xast two deoade8t> hm noir 
aoterod upc«i a naw stage of pfogreas. fha investnient mad* 
in ttia bag inning for Rasaaroh and dait < e^|i&e»t haa started 
pagrini dan^ danda* the adtdevaatenta of the mielear 
iafxmatv«itiif% unOar 1 ^ atomio mi&9$y pm&pmmmf ^fiiboiiaea 
tlie nat i^U detemiaation to aeMarre self stiffieien^ in the 
field of anaXear eneitjr* 
ItediaU effiert in the fiald of the devaiopiBent of 
notlear anafiy have been m^nm in the norid. Zhaia has 
snoaeedei in evoliring «Qd bvilding a ffonti^ seienee and 
teCteslogy suah ae nnelear mugft right froa the laboratoiy 
atage to the Xnditatriai stage lafgeiy on ita ovn* The 
y^ 
0f * pwe«fia anslwr dffieo and titt MtftMlltteattt of 
various imeloar instillatioiifi in India »0]»f«8ifit tho 
beginning of a nnicino and ^Haollf Indian Seientlflo otattiro 
liaving ft troBonaoos polltleid. slgnlfleanoo for India* a 
ft2tnre« 
BSMJirWffif:^  or mmm w^mmm M fmmtm 
India has if«Bialned a aain faotor as far M 
Pakistan's nnelear polloy is ooncoraed* ^Mmk Pakistan 
failsd to aohievs parity "with India in dof#noe| i t entered 
in military allianoo ^th IB4 and Chlnn, JUttwt m^^ 
PatdLstan realisad that its parity ^tli India in defonco 
eotad not bo aoliievtd, and thus i t enbarksd c^n a nnolear 
voi^ pons piograsmoy to ootntor balanso India's povor 
position* Priso Ministor snifikar AU Bhutto had said in 
If la^a builds the bo«b| «o will oat grass 
or loaves, or ovan go hungrjTi but we vill ..^ 
got oao of our own. ^ have no alternativo*^' 
Bvar sineo Bhutto daotarod vith a drwatio flara, 
bask in tho siartioSf tliot Pakistan would prodaso a nualoar 
boa i^ ovitt of tho paopSlo of PiOclataa voro ooapaSlIod to oat 
m. Wtod k M ^alti 0^ m iadboodiri, n. ik, p. If* 
! i j 
grmae %h» m n^anee of the bomb over tho sub^contlaeat has 
mm jbem smiAm*^ Tbm^-i^ imtBmtdm «v4*©ii&r tjf i ^ i 
faot that P«klstaa is moving towards a tiaolaar vaapons 
oapabHity* Despite the disooverios of elandestine 
attempts to obtain oqtdj®ents aad know hov for uranium 
mriohcisnt and plutonium roprooacsing plant and despite the 
efforts of the ^^stera countries to halt Pakistan's, 
progress in the field continues laaliEpeaed, 
Bhutto I had further said in 1979 
W© knot? that Israel and South Africa hcsve 
ft3ill nuclear capability, fh© Christian Jetfish and nindu Civilisations have this 
capability, She CoBnaanist powers a l ^ 
T)08sess i t . Only the Islamic Civilisations 
WL& ^thout i t but that position ^as about 
to <diange, 132 
For ^utto the main eoncern was a nuelear bomb for 
Pakistan so that i t could speak to India froa a Position of 
strength* Ever since, Pakistan has been seeretely acquiring 
the nuclear be&b teetaaology and the requisite raw ssaterial 
ifhile aseerting tbmt all the preparations were purely for 
peseefiH purposes, 
Pakistan has been able to march speedily towards 
i ts goal throu^ fugitive methods including steeith and 
f s i Biiiitte, n. &f, p> m . 
H^ 
diaguisid dealings with the passage of tine Pakistan 
rmSLlze&f ffiaf It shomiTpIlMs * iniea:«p t»PBrtr=ttr ®erif» 
as a detterent against mjf attaok t^ India. Pakistans 
at(»aie flants have oontinuaLly f^orked on uranltsa oirieh* 
S!©nt devices and have sueoeeded to a remarkahle degree. It 
has clandestively actnireS eomponeats of reactors and bomtss 
throtigh secret ^m^B and m o^cis. 
PMristan's Haolear prograimB© b^an in t953f tiion 
tho Psalsistan Atomie aiergy CJoMiittee «as set up. The 
OofBEitteo XJSLB entrusted tiith the following ta^ss i 
CD abo miTVW of radioactive minerals* 
(ii) 'ferking otjfe a plan for the Atomic Energy 
in Pakistan and; 
Ciii) Hiding recomendations on all matters connected 
%^rflth tho utilisation of atomic energy. ^^ 
By 1955 the Pakistan OovenuB i^t set ^sp an Atomic 
energy oomittee to prepare a detailed scheete for the 
survey and assessment of radioaotive isinerals ^oik out a 
pl«a for the establishment of an Institute of Atomic Energy 
in Pakistani and make reeoonendations on all other matters 
connected ^ t h the utilisation of Atomic Energy. The 
AtCBie Bnergy Comissiott of the ikiited states, offered to 
m. m Uii mA Mi i^awbooari, n, g^ ^ p, ^8, 
^J 
r«ader assistaned In the a«v«lope}ent of tmolQar seienoe 
= = ia^^Elstaiw AdsojRUng to thla offer^«ld.atan jttanaedjbo 
pxo<mrc an retoareh reactor from ITSA, half of the cost met 
hy that country.*^^ 
Jn 195&, the Atomic Baergy Cosanittee \ms u^ r^aded to 
Pakistan Atomic Siergy Coaanlsalon PAEC ana the Cocaalssioa 
soon made arrangem^ts for tho training of a large niinher 
of soloatlsts in radio isotopes and reactor technology* In 
1958 i t miB proposed to set up a reactor for fundfimental 
research and for the productioa of isotopes. "^  
2a oo^pcsration tilth tSie OS Atomic i^ergy Conmlsslon 
meamtrcnent of radio active fall out had started during the 
same period. In tho htilget estamate provision of Hs (P) 2.5 
mn. in the t955-?6 budget for Research in atomic mergy %fas 
folioved hy a subsequent provision next year of Hs« (P) 5*0 
mn« and the expenditure during the First Five Year Plan 
i%959^) I bat outside the plan outlay aootnted to some 
Hs, (P) 23»5 nn« In the budget estimate of 196a»6i| the 
cost of reactor i«raa included for the first time* ^ 
During President Ayid» Kban*s rule but under Bhutto's 
iik^ S,^. Guba. "Pafcistaa's Atoale ifetwnr Pregrawae". strategic 
Analysis l^ wranl» mtt^tg Jif Mmit atmft&a anfl toriYafii 
135* OK* Pal i t and ncs'HMtboodiri! n* 62, *p* iS« 
13&, OvUa, n. 1 ^ , pi»« 117»130* 
.So 
Sjamediato suporvlsion speeial stress %ms laid on ^9 
ilev&2.«pt^trt»f muitmit mmtgy ito F^^istanr ^Ms Ms « 
dev^opment perlM of fttieloar progyanas© in Pakistan as tha 
nueXearisation plekad up speod. Duidng tha poilod of eight 
years beginning from 19^ Pakistan's expenliture on the 
developiaettt of mwlear tootoology aootmted to Hs. (P) 32^ mn, 
Hs, (P) 290 ian# on 11 re^aroh centres esBQludli:^  Hs, ^ 0 an* 
for Karachi nuclear powers lafoject. rost of the eocp^aaiture 
on nuclear reactor tr^ s sbotm under the capital outlay on 
fuel and pother dev^oi;meat« PiUilD had also dra^ m up a plan 
137 
for Getting up of ^30 mx? of nuclear power in ^mst Pakistan, 
A ^mj mriEning Pool reactor x^ ent critical la QcoGciber 
Soon after he took over as the Prime Minister of 
his oountzy, Zifl.fiqar All Bhutto| reorganised Pakist«^*s 
Atoeie ^ergy CoBHsissioni ylhUoh according to hita was on3y a 
signboard of an offiee^ and gave thera clear direetions for 
prtparing a programe for rapid nudear teebnology 
developaent. Accordingly« Pakistan Atoiale Energy Chief 
Hunir Atasad Khan i^apared a plan, for eoomissioning 1^ 
nuclear rettctors with a total capacity of 9^)0 W, so as to 
provide thirty percent of the country's eleetrieity 
generatiag capacity lay the ttam of the ceatui*y« ^ 
t i l . OK m%% mA M Hanboo^  R edlriy n* 62, p« 19# 
s 
AlthouKhy th« ^t ir« prograiaas m.a seemlr^ gly soared 
fdr «aefgy proouotion aoa otn«r peftoerta appxxoa^iotist vno 
puiaic in ta® comtpy as well m ot^sld© sttsi)eot;ed that 
the piograaflae \ias roaXX; a cover for developing compotonoe 
and facilities for weapons paroduotlon, This i s clear frc© 
Blititta's Q^M tmtmmt made from his prison cell* Biaifcto 
had a^otlated for ttm ptrchas® of a plufconima racovery 
plant i:r<m France^ Later, Fraseo roalled from the agreement. 
Hoijovor, Pakistan xms obtaining secretdy from Uost Europe, 
Casadat oad tho USA., dratAt^ cj COTipmcnto aM otiier daterlals, 
recitdroffi for a centriftaec plant iihloh i t has since set up at 
Eahtita. A omall plntonlum reprooessing plant imn also set 
Pakistan, also Obtained considerable quantities of 
uranits!! from Nigeria, France and Libya, and flurinatlon 
plant from West GeffBaoor. 
The Palcistan Atomic fioftzgy Conedaslon* s PrinclpiCL 
Research Centre Is the Pakistan Xhstltute of !l^lear Science 
and Technology (PIHSTHSH) at Ni&ore in IslMiabad, PNlSTBCH 
la to Pfllclstan vhat the Bhabha Atoale Researoh Centre is to 
|1|6, MUh, n* if, W ai5« 
1M« | i i | i | niiff^  •fch*_flyi. f i n a InaUtufke of Scientific Reeeareh 
WrWSSSSmnmmnom Allied Fii>llah«rst !>elhl, 1979tfi«23* 
iVa* Heira Report 1» n^^ tn^ fc^ ** g<«*«^  !ltir Delhi, 16 v^dy 1981, 
ii6 
laaia. It i s dtsigcted to Ise the oountry's l«ading resottreh 
SEret tmtning e«titirer ^ i^«"P.4r£«C l^iaa ^lao.^iit^ vtp amntitm. 
of resoareh at Lahore, Tando Jam, Jamshore, Karachi and 
Mcatati* In t967f the first batch of radlo*isotopes ims 
tiTodaoeS in the PIH3TQQH, t^ich has since been able to 
produce a nuaber of radio^isotopes like P3tassitu»*^2y 
Iodine»13t, phosphoru8-.32 and soditua-^. Intensive research 
on the api^Lication of radio-isotopes in indtiatry, agriculture, 
ccdiolne is going on in these centres. The centre at Lahore 
established 1961 has a l^ f-KiJ neutron gmorator, a natural 
uranium light tmter sub-oritieal assembly and a 13,000 curio, 
cobalt-60 source. Pakistan also entered into agrements 
for cooporation in the f i^d of mtolear energy yith a 
nuBiber of cotmtries including Canada, the VSoit^ states, 
1H^3 France and Husaia. 
Pakistan's first nuclear poorer plant hairlz^ a 
capacity of 137 MV and located soise 1^ miles i<test of 
Karachi at Parwiise point on the BiXleji Coast vas built 
on a turnkey basis by the Canadian General KLeetrie Compaiiy 
and tA8 inatigiirated by Bhutto in Hovuber 1972* Canada 
granted a soft loan of $ 23 olllion and a credit of another 
1^* Pilit and BaaA^odiri, a, 62, p. i% 
\iJ 
$ Zh sdllloQ to eover the foreiftn eseohaiaeo costs of thij 
KUnt. Japan pfoviaea a eradit of $ 3*6 lailllm foif a 
turl3o«g«ierator. Iha reactor will use oatiiral tofaaiiM 
as fueit and hespr^ Wkter as inoderator and coolant. This 
nuclear power plant hm been placed m&&p latarnatlcmal 
Safeguard* Xt Is slightly mall version of India* s RAPPI 
at Hana Fratap Sagar, '^ It i s reputed to be th© laost 
!!)od@rn in. design with on line oompaters to regtjlate 
reactor op^atlons. T\40 o^er computers control th© 
fuclliag madiino set vsp \fithin the co!3ple2t. The latest 
ideas on reactor safety have been incorporated in the design 
of the reactor and associated control apparatus* Canadian 
experiesice in the erection and operaticm of the systeei is 
available to B^istan* The quantity and cost of isfanium 
needed can be estii&ated from thB design geometry of the 
reactor fi la dttaUs, regarding which are not available J 
This Canadian aided I37 m Karachi Kjiclear Power 
Psojeot is the first nuclear povar plant t^iieh becane 
critical on 1 August, 19711 soaAsing Pakistan's entry into 
t^e sophisticated ^ n d of nuclear teolsx>logy» ' 
In March 1966, the national eoonoiBio couaeil of 
l ? ' ^ * ' 
., PP» 1?»20, 
, —i, n» %y¥^ 
lh% Indian in norld stratagio aovirooMiit Annual fitnAmi 
tmi Vol. I, 197^71$ nmf ixaihi, pp. k^^k^. 
!J i 
Pakistan approved the estat^lsbeieat of a IVO vm Huelear 
jio^ iBV. atatioa alL Booimiir la laat Pay^taru^ 2a tSM# P ^ 
s%ned an agreem^t with tmJsoo-pxwiwcport of U33K tor %im 
preparation of a toclsiioal tM c6oix»nio feasibility report 
for this iilant# But mfortimat^ly in 19711 East PaJtistan 
beonBO an independent nation BangXaAos^  m^ y^th i t a set 
bac': to Pa^ dLstan*8 dream of madear capability. 
Another power plan is planned to be set xip near the 
Chashma Barrage in Mant^ali district. The plant t^ hich was 
approved la July 19731 tdll have a capacity of 9>0 Kl7» ^ 
iM[lg8Jg.„l^¥Qg:rrc»"P,Qgalifeiaittea Plaatr ,SAMffl 
It has a capacity of 300 Hi^  of power end ^ im 
gallons of water p&e day. ^ 
Initially PeScistan had oo Icnown reserves of naelear 
Bti4eral8* Bat then niaerals were located in Pakistiui. The 
sands and ainerias included a^stantiia anotmts of ziroon 
and small aoounts of Monasdte* The reserves of heavy 
minerals were estimated at B^7fOOO tons of sand ineliading 
10 percent of minerals and I63y000 tons of sand, containing 
TprOTa[p5ri|c , 
%mB Pelit and iMboodiri, n« 62, p« 2K>. 
150« Q^ Miy n. 13^ * 
llii 
20 pttreeat of h«avy sdneraXs and 63,000 tons of sand 
o(^;alalag^-30^ idair^l, :bi 196 ,^ ibistraXlan «a:p@rts 
vozkiog for PABC wera reportad to have disao'varad large 
qtttfititles of viraniuffi} near gilgit In occupied Kashmir and 
Zironiw and Tataniiua, Barllar i t was elaimed that tiraniua 
&a& obtain other rMSo-^tivo raimrals had heen fotmd in 
tiie Indus Slv&e Sai&s wa& prospaoting for uraniuiB in 
Dera Qhasi Khan had shot^ satisfaetory results. ^ ^^  
mcoaraged by theso discsoverias PAH3 designed and 
put 3nt» operation taio Atoaio Cmtra at Lahore, a pilot 
plant for tha dstraotion of uraniiaa oras, A teaia of 
Csechte^ovafeian mining ezperts have hem. engaged to 
l<a 
prepare a fmsiblli^ otudies in the Dera Ghasi Khan area. * 
Pa2£iStan's nuclear fuel resources are limited despite 
the optiaism of Dr. Munir Ahmad Shan, Chairman of PAEC, that 
Pakistan ^Uld not only he %elf*suffieient** in uranitaa hut 
itoiILd alao be able to export i t . For the extraction of 
uraniiia a pilot with a eapaoilgr of 100 poinds a day has 
been set vip in Lahore nark on a fuel fabrication faei l i^, 
iihieh started %Ath Canadian aid is reported to be 
psograssiag. Pakistan* s ostensible plans for the future 
in<d.tida ttie oonstmetion of sixteen more reactors by 1990. 
lu'^ 
Ttm finance of thes9 reaetors were floepeeted to Some from 
153 frieadly West Asian Coimtarlos and th© i*»rXd Bank. 
la tho fi«ld of HuelMr mtmoQf PaJdlstan has befln 
reeeivlng assistaneo fspom s@v@riiX eotmtrias. Pakistan has 
eonclMed agreements for atoiaie oo«operation, xdlth a 
niMjtr of countries, & 1962 PABC entered into an 
agreeaent t^th Franco for oXoso oo-operation and supply of 
matorialo and in 196? i t eoncluded an agroemeat T?lth 
DcnEsark. 'She sa^o yc^r Canada eigned tho agreasimt to 
construct Karachi nu^ear Po^ «af a a a t and provided S 60 ©n 
aid for it» In 1966, Italy signed an agrooaont for 
collaboration xtith Pa!sistan m ^ Q field of trainlag and 
supply of nuclear ciaterials and equipaont. Durlno the 
nme year Spain aleo signed the agreement \jith Pakistan. ^ 
China signed ^ e economic and teoisiioal oo«-operation 
agreement on 30 July, 1966.^^ 0r. AMus Salam and other 
Paikistani Seientiste vere in Peiking on May 20, 19^* 
Pakistan and XfSSR signed a 10 year agreement providing 
eseehanges of seientists and teelmloail knovhow. In addition 
to this ^apan Cetichoslovakia and Australia have also 
1^ 6 
r « i d « ^ teelnisal asslstanee to Pakistan. ^ 
1^3* Paiit and iiiaboodiri, n^ 62, p. 20. 
f 5 ^ Qtftia, n. 13H, pp* 18*25. 
^S* Mi 1^* S C 
ft^ ^ tiiiitl0itf> lH«titttfe« fop Aggjeiatiaf and Biology (mxB) 
This iastitat« at Falt^jjiail is ungagM 4»^  ^he ^mmt 
of nuolear energy ^or oonstrtiotlvd purposts* It has 
0VoXved a M«h yl€tLdisg and early maturing irariot^ of rloe 
caXldA *%aslsair Bassiati**, as w^l as a higb yielding and 
early aattaping mutant of cotton. '^' 
But parMps tbeso p<me©fta titiliaatlon i s jtast a 
filsgtiiQ© for Pakistan to ^ cm ahoad on i t s ia.an to 
develop nt3ctloar weapons, 
Ttm from the very beginning, i t Bem& that 
Paliistan tms bmt i^n acc»ii^i»S nnelear capability and 
forced l^dia to aodlfy i ts nuol<^ UP polloy frora titn© to 
time. Paicistan through secret meansi has aoqttired 
coaponents of atomic rectors inorder to speed vm i t s 
ntiele«y?isatSon piogjmimse. 
Wm Abdisl QadaJf Khan, a top Pald.stani Soientisti 
has said tliat Pakistan has laaazfacttirad an atomic bomb, 
biifc has no lamediata plans to tast i t . He has also said 
^lat vaapons grade uraniusi had bean produced at the Kahuta 
laboratories* He was giving an interview to the London 
based daily the observer* The papmt said ih&t the 
197* Iftnif A^ Mid iWi cdhaiTBan of FAttd) liiy Pi^istMi needs 
mnimst 7«ebailoiyt fairifteii *!»#•> (Karaehi 9 JtB», l9St)* 
158« ''^ ^*T* T^  ?*^ **f TKnirS w«h, I9d7« 
'ill 
Aral) ootmtri^s bad heOLp^ d Pakistan in its qiMst* The 
a joliit strike against Pakistani ntiol^ uf instelXations* 
Tha appxoadh was is^a in 19B61 «^eh was refused by 
IndiaJ^ 
HimSf i t i s olear tbat Pakistan's intention is 
swpdlV to mmt«fa©t«r© nnelear tfeapons inorder to dominat© 
India> and is sure to use the ntielear oapabilil^i if i t 
tet^Q itself threatened from the side of India, as is evident 
from Dr* Q^ ftar Khan*6 o^ oi statoacsit t 
ll>body om undo Pakistan or take us for 
granted* ^e are here to s t^ , and let i t 
be clear tliat ve shall use t&e b(»ab, if 
ovBP esdstmoe is threatened, 160. 
fio* Q Q ; 
Kij 
Hurano ire in trooble. This truth Is realized on 
t»tai §t««f dT the polIticadL euoA ld«ologlcal devldo as 
thor© are lots o^  nucloar devices imiting to be delivered 
at their precic» targets by a varletgr of raetiiods, inrilctlog 
irrG!iarablo daaase to the planet's civilisation and pushing 
i t on ^© brink of destriiotloa* Pakistan Is sddinu to tho 
trouble by rapidly going aiiead ^lith i ts nuclearinatlon 
procroiiffio tihioh i s Q throat to India's Security aati i t s 
torritorial integrity, 
India lias rcBaineS a raro and shining oxco^tion of 
a country or continental dimensions vast diversities antl 
betdldorinc oomrlexltlos holdlnn ^Qst to ao»-alir'nment and 
tho 'irinolple of panohsheel, 
India after Indot^ endenco decided not to 3©in either 
power blod s but to exist independently and vork for the 
furtherence of vorld peace* It ardopted a policy %ixich was 
neither pro Huesian nor pro American but a policy of 
peaoeftil oo^exlstenee with both the power blocks. As 
India wkB in urgent need for an all round development of 
the country* India lost no tine in creating the infra* 
strusture for ntelear developeent in the oountry* The 
AteiBlc Etaergy Conrdssion was sot up in 19^ 8 within a year 
lOo 
of the country becoming free. Dr. Homi Kiabha who e 
eventually became the father of India's unique nuclear 
programme placing India in the exclusive nuclear club in 
less than thirty years was appointed the Head of the new 
body, India had started from the scratch. Although, the 
World was aware of the fearsome potential of the atom, 
after the American's had destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
in Japan, with their atomic bombs, the tremendous potential 
of Atom for peace and progress was yet to be visualised and 
explored, as India was interested in making use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, for generating electricity, 
for. Speeding up plant growth for bringing rel4if to its teeming 
millions and for other developmental purposes, 
Jawaharlal Nehru who became India's first Prime 
Minister, was convinced that the road to progress for India 
lay In making the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He was 
against the nuclear energy being used for weapons 
productions and other destructure purposes. Not only the 
economic considerations, but geographical considerations 
too demanded that India followed a policy of peaceful 
co-existence, as it had two powerful communist countries 
as its neighbours, 
A nuclear war did not present the possibility of either 
a victory or defeat. It only presented the 
possibility of complete destruction. Nehru therefore 
V}i 
considered disarmament, the most important thing because 
the question of the very survival of the human race was 
linked to it. 
But after the Qiinese aggression Nehru realized the 
weakness of his own foreign policy, India's policy became 
realistic ar)d defence oriented. The need of nuclear energy 
as a aource of nuclear weapons also began to be realised. 
But still India advocated the Use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful jjurposes. But the options had certainty narrowed. 
In the wake of Qiina's first atomic test explosion 
in October 1964, a widespread support for the development of 
nuclear weapons was exhibited, A practical approach to the 
needs of border defence by developing a powerful detterent 
in the shape of actual nuclear weapons was pleaded. However, 
inspite of all the lobbying in favour of the manufacture of 
indegenous atom bomb, government of India remained consistent 
through out with the one laid down by Late Pt, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, 
After Nehru*s death, mild mannered Shastri became the 
Prime Minister of India, Though he reiterated, previous govern-
ments stand, but he modified Indians nuclear policy. It was still 
a peaceful nuclear policy but with a difference Shastri 
gave the permission for the peaceful nuclear explosions 
which was a change in India 's nuclear 
iDj 
polle^Tf to make i t wove pra^B^tlOi imtd&p to dooonstrate 
to ttm \}osld ttmt India's policy tms :»t stat ic b!2t dynaaie* 
ilfto* ihagtrl 's 3eaih IMira QmaM iHrontrtto 
Prlnc rinlator. r^e oontiauoS to s^&mre to tho ntieloar 
neliey or ^osccftH uses of umlmr eaergi? 'i?ltl:»tlt otthor 
comafilnc to the Intri^cD, ralln txi^ :ii»9n3"ar03 of* tDmiliiB to 
tfc® cxtcraal rrsrstiKJ to aecer^ ss I*ito«atlnif!i3. ni*re«*c>at 
tlc^-" ^ mtal to tho n&tiQwl iotdPost, 
Ca T:^ %uf iJ'^^f Ia«Jia esi?PiGa out f i r s t iad©rc£^^i^ 
nisclf^ a:^  cr~22lr.9at for ncaoo^'Jl 'i-uruossa a^ !^  b .^car^ ': t!ie 
f irnt da^dlo:^lac co tu t^ arort ?roc the M j^ five to !m^c 
cojfj^ e.^  otit susil: an c^i^rl'sant. 'Jl^is b»tJBlst a cnont'-^ nfotm 
nijblio aaci .•'r®:5s reactions ^ t a la tU© coi2atJ?y tiid atsroaa to 
vfiicjh Indira CIIQL::II clarici©: t!mt t h ^ c '.as a :ilfftu?mce 
bctvem a msnlmit QO'M%T/ aad a w>a atjolear country aa^ ": 
that la-ila voatod to uso the Vmo^JL&Sgn of aiiclisar eaerjsy 
for --caoeftil pnrpo3©0* '^on yorarji '5oaai bocaco the 
Prico I'iniater, the auolMT p^ioy ^as enuoeiated %^  hiss 
on 3rd !*areh 1977. H© had said that Zn^a i^ tflLd atili?,© 
atomio onopgy for rf«aoof^ ptir*T09©s only and i^ ould in no 
oiretesetamas laanafaotupo auelaar ^aapoos on ?'ay 7f ilfi 
ahri f'brarji ^oaai had very eategoidestlly told th© oaabers 
Vlj 
of parlifi83oat In a neetiag of eoasiatatiir© ootssEJlttoo of 
Paxllameiife attosbid ^ J^_9o,?^rtafii2% of Ataale EQfift|t«^ 
'^mee aal oloetfonles that AB long as h© wis tli© 
PTSR© ' ! lals t^9 !» timild not go for th® bc3®1&» Bat tho 
Jamta &cw«raK©nt coiati l^ot y^taaln in offteo for loag m& 
Chartm ".M^ took ovor as tho Prloc rJMster^ He liawMl^  
had tin® to frame tip hlo ooasietoat nueloar Tnolioy ai^ 
l!r£s« Gno4lil acata eaao Moik to potior, 3!i© ooatirmoi fes 
Collov t^io cape Littoloar -jolloy 0I20 l ^ bcm follcnilii:' la 
the -^ast, .i'rtor tlio ansas^jEmttoa of l!^s Carslld 
Ha^iv iia^lM tool! oiror as tlio na? Prico I'iaiotcr. Tio 
otjoaoi tri tijo ouelmp optioao for India oM mi^malaof. 
timt luilla TJOtHS tis© micilcKir oncrggr for woaiTons r-'Soauotloa 
If i t docE50'2 absolmtoly aoeossauy* Oo^ag t&o t^cmt '^ ron 
ttio sldo o^ Pn^ilatan India aoaiflM i t s mioio^ polioy. 
Thus liadia m^^  ftoreod by P^^istaal msolc^rlsation lapogrewjc 
to opm t^ i t s masloar options* 
India's Rtioioar futuro is ecmtlngont to tame dsgroo 
upon ^hat Pn^istan 01^ do, %Atli the arrajr of taelmologios, 
i t has oXofarijr tioot legced into tho stit)oontin«nt| as 
Pakistan aeoording to '^ostom ai^onoios Hoports is going 
ah<^ on a tiaapaoa produetlon progrttoe©* K top Pakistan 
soiontist liSAvd Kadar Khan had said that Pakistan had the 
l:ii 
oapabilll^ to manufaoture ntiolear v^pons* 
India has not closed i t s nuclear options and the 
Indian loadership has repeatedly said that tbotigh India is 
a non-alignod country, but if i ts security or territorial 
iateerity Is threatened, i t td.ll not hesitate to accelerate 
i t s nuclear progranaac, to counter balance Pakistan's nuclear 
threat and vovHQ. manufacture nuclear arms to give a fitting 
reply to the eneay tor any lalsadvcnture on i t s Tjart* 
Dut at prcG^it India i s foUotdi^ a peaceful auoloar 
policy act India is a large country teeoli^ yillf^llicn3» 
2ho country •o poverty sr^ caks of tlie fact tliat India should 
not go tn for nuclear armamenta, the money and resources 
spent on nuclear tjeapons programao can bo used :n other 
peaceful purposes such as tiaoving moimtains digging tfellSf 
improvino heal^, securing and providing fuel and pover to 
India's numerous industries* Nuclear energy alone could bo 
used in peaeeftO. purposes such as generation of electricity* 
Preservation, medical therapy and loany others* It must be 
mentioned in this context, that powers generated by nuclear 
energy sold to various electrical grids vas worth more th«i 
170 crores* This is an indication \jhAt the country is 
capable of achieving, as the situation demands and as 
i l l 
dependence on other sources of energy d@or@ases* 
But as Pakistan has heeoae an Ssportaat factor In 
Asia, tho Internal and external policies of tho military 
dictators baffo begtm to Influeaco th© course of events In 
Asia Palsifltan to laovlns tovards a nuclear wea?x>ns caimhUlty, 
tla?catonlnc India's security, *hG Pa^ dLstanl loaderahlp Is 
rocortlns to a variety,of methods to justify their ohsosalon 
tflth omo raoG and stl ltarlly ouporiorlty. 2hey hatro tried 
to nloiat<a?prct tlieir position by saying repeatedly, that 
thqy oro being threatened f ron the side of India. But tho 
so oallod Indian threat has outlived i t s credibility and 
people are beginning to realise that i t is a sraoko screen, 
deslcned to dlsgulso the nuclearisation only to discredit 
India's peaceful foreign policy, i t sems Pakistan the 
aspirlnc bomb ciaker has evaded International safeguards, in 
the quest for veancmry. F^latan has been successful to 
tap petro«dollars to build i t s iiiar oachlnas making the 
laatter s t i l l tense and alarming. Pakistan has clandestinely 
procured component a which could be used in the production 
of nuclear weapons. 
If Pakistan does dev^op ntaclear weapons, there 
^111 be a qualitative change in Indians security 
wvlronment and from India's point of view an unacceptable 
11. 
to be maintained by India at any cost* Perils Sdems to be 
gro^ng tsrith eacb passing iiour, as Pakistan is bent on 
aoqtdring, ntusXear capability* In order to balanoe 
PakistsBi* s nuclear superiority and iaorder to safeguards 
i ts O';^  security I India ^tQ.d be coispelled to speed up i t s 
o\si nuclearisation programsoi to cose at par with P^istcm, 
*fith nucdear threats from the sidestchlna and Pakistan, 
India tjotild be left ^ t h no other alternative but to 
nanufaeturo nuclear arsaraent. India om very w ^ do i t 
tfitti itc o\n st»)orior technology. The production o? 
nuclear nmiyom by either Pakistan or India can create 
grave risks as nuclear weapons can be passed on to a 
terrorist or revolutionary organisation x^ifih depmdlr^ on 
i t s motivations can Cfffoctively hold an entire city or ev^a 
nation hostage to i t s demands. In this cosmic era, vdth 
highly trained terrorist organisation, nothing seems to be 
Impossible* 3ome specific terrorist ^rovtas have already 
been identified as having the eapability and possibility to 
s e ^ materials of tieapons, by the Fedral Bureau Investigation 
and the CIA. The FBI and the CIA are engaged in a top 
secret study to assess the risks posed if terriorists 
obtain nudear weapons. The nuclear Regulatory oos^ssion 
is particularly eoneemed that nuclear poiier plants nay be 
II 
vt^norablo to attqokSf aisdXar to those usofi in lest Asia* 
^iim HSjsyta^^aip o f n ma&msr ijo^orirtaat- tsaa- tjf^se « 
Chernobyl tyn® roQotlonf and spraad radiation ovar a vast 
oroa, ^:illiae Sanocont n ^ ' l o , Orotms night at1 t^e*i a 
Taeility to asrtiipo natoriaXs to E^T© a tioisb oi» obtain a i 
asa0i'iloc l^oA ons# 'lacl©ar aottortrno cai be ttz^'^ in 
liolsllnc -x>"-iilatiaas of itato.':: as hjjstasss wit^ tl-ir thprat 
of ,'::3iil^aIaCl0a. 
A nuolO'iT \m3P i t 3l3o::a.cl be rancnbGrad, i s not a 
co2tii3suitiD22 olT "politics l(y otIiGP coaaD btd» i t Is the oai 
05? al l itilitioc aaa if iiltlicsr of the so-jatUcs l»icUa oy 
?a'd2taQ naauZsKJtur© ijalcjar aacs f i r s t aad vice vdesa 
tiicafe "Swad Ijogin a cocinetitiire nnjclcmr attlti*lc tlafeatcEi* 
lag tlic security of nations* 
But ioopit© of the oiril consequaaeos of imdear %m3f 
aiKS the repiVQUsoions of a nndloaJr i^ eap<»is T r^onrepoe India 
v i i l ha"^ to i^ vodao© msldar weapons inordar to keep i t s 
teiTitori«l iatigflty Intaot, lh« stataiaeiite taado bgr 
Bajiv Gandhi f rae tine to t i sa in aontoxt of the 
PiMstani nu^eailsation are elear indications that the 
oeeurity of the eomtry ^ f^ill never be eomprondsed at ac^ 
eost and thus Pakistan and China %fill never be able to 
1 H 
mktiQty t^«dr i^ oTted cnbitioris* Tb«re is ao tSoulit that 
i»aldlsfeia»xi ipbifeloii to sols© Ksshalr ^11 be deofS^ M in 
thci imteps of tht ;ai©lyB and sijiim'it ^lifnn nt ^£«?^ 
mLTMTM.nt^j tTiXi T^?l3li Ja tlio m^\m at tim niealfj^as ae 
the i5moer.a m& aon*taienoa ]Dcsdia xtill m^ vmv&n 
tJfan:iilt a:^ s:tjoctiG oadoi? the cnctn-j^ B Cioat vlolmt 
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